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THE COLOR OF PERSPECTIVE:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RHETORIC OF WHITE INNOCENCE
Cecij. Hunt, II*
This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in
deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's
use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective,
representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to
accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This
Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in
constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of
White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent"
Whites in affirmative action cases. This Article concludes that the Court's insistence
on choosing and imposing only one racialized perspective--the White-centered
perspective--in racially-inflected constitutional claims is more than simply bad
policy: that choice embodies an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article calls for an appreciation of the
dominant use and problematic character of the judicial imposition of an arbitrarily
chosen racial perspective in deciding all constitutional race cases. It suggests a
modification in judicial decisionmaking in which judges become conscious of the
White-centeredness and arbitrariness and racial contingency of the White-centered
vantage point. This Article urges a judicial appreciation of multiple levels of racial
interpretation in an effort to loosen the hegemonic grip of the White-centered
perspective and dilute its power on the mind and imagination of the judiciary. If this
goal can be achieved, the White-centered perspective will become just one option
among a multitude of equally-respected racial perspectives that can then fairly
compete for both judicial recognition and legitimization.
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work in progress and all the helpful comments and encouragements I .received from the
attendees. I am especially grateful to Michele Bratcher Goodwin, John Calmore and my
colleagues Tayyab Mahmud, Walter Kendall and Bill Mock for many helpful insights, sug-
gestions and critiques in thinking through the arguments raised in this work. I am also
greatly indebted to Kelly Stulginskas for her superb research assistance and to The John
Marshall Law School for financial support through a summer research grant. I also owe a
debt too great to repay to my wife Marjorie and sons C.J. and Stephen for their support
and patience during the preparation of this Article.
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Once we see that any point of view, including one's own, is a point of
view, we will realize that every difference we see is seen in relation to
something already assumed as the starting point. Then we can expose
for debate what the starting points should be. The task for judges is to
identify vantage points, to learn how to adopt contrasting vantage
points, and to decide which vantage points to embrace in given circum-
stances.
INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, race and racism remain
among "the central issue[s] in American life,' 2 and affirmative action re-
mains one of its most intractable and divisive battlegrounds.3 But there
can be little question that despite its continuing salience, racism in
1. Martha Minow, Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HAv. L. REv. 10, 15 (1987).
2. STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE:
ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 14 (Simon & Schuster 1997).
3. See Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REv. 15 (1991) (character-
izing the nature of the national affirmative action debate as "intractable," illustrated by the
tension between the "rhetoric of innocence" and the "rhetoric of guilt").
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America is not what it used to be.' Some argue that racism has been es-
sentially eradicated; ' they see neither its operation nor its effects
anywhere and champion what they describe as a new common sense
about race that emphasizes colorblindness 6 Others see the operation and
effects of racism almost everywhere, and insist that in contemporary
America, racism's "shelf life ... in social and political behavior" is so en-
during that it "is as healthy today as it was during the Enlightenment.
'8
Still others urge that racism's most virulent contemporary manifestation is
in fact a form of reverse racism aimed at innocent Whites, especially
White males, who, it is argued, have been unfairly burdened by ancient
sins that they did not commit in favor of modern claimants who have not
suffered. 9
However, there can be no question that at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, American racism directed against people of color in
4. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 13 (observing the confusion
surrounding the national racial debate: "There is no racism; there is nothing but racism.
The issue sends people scurrying in extremist directions.").
5. See id. at 534 (arguing that any "serious [racial] inequality that remains is less a
function of white racism than of the racial gap in levels of educational attainment, the
structure of the black family, and the rise in black crime."). See also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM &
STEPHEN THERNSTROM, No ExcusEs: CLOSING THE RACiAL GA IN LEARNING (2003); PAUL
M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES, REACHING BEYoND RACE (1997) (arguing that
based on public opinion surveys racism has decreased significantly among American
Whites by reaching beyond race); SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED xiii (1994) (arguing
that the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was a betrayal of America's best principles and
was an effort at the "expiration of American shame rather than the careful and true devel-
opment of equality between the races"); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE (1994)
(arguing for a focus on Black culture rather than White racism as the source of racial ine-
quality).
6. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2. See also Michael Omi, Rethinking
the Language of Race and Racism, 8 ASIAN L.J. 161, 161-62 (2001) (arguing that race is no
longer important as a social category). But see MICHAEL K. BROWN Er AL., WHITEWASHING
RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLORBLIND SOCIETY (2003); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A
COLOR-BLIND FUTURE (1997); Neil Gotanda, A' Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind"
44 STAN.L.REV. 1 (1991).
7. See Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race--Does the
Fundamental Contradiction Have A Corollary?, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 407 (1988)
(noting that "white people rarely see acts of blatant or subtle racism, while minority peo-
ple experience them all the time .... [and] live in a world dominated by race."). See also
DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DE-
MOCRATIC IDEALS 287 (1996) (arguing that "Meanwhile, blacks see racial discrimination as
ubiquitous; they think of prejudice as a plague .... ).
8. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS IN THE LITERARY IMAGINA-
TION 63 (1993).
9. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 7, at 287. See also ROBERT JENSEN, THE HEART
OF WHITENESS: CONFRONTING RACE, RACISM, AND WHITE PRIVILEGE 11 (2005) (noting that
many contemporary Whites "simply claim that the United States has moved past racism
and is not a white-supremacist society .... others claim that in recent years white privi-
lege has eroded and been replaced by reverse racism against whites.").
SPRING, 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
general, and African Americans in particular, has changed dramatically
over the last 300 years.' There is still much to be done before true racial
equality can be realized. A matter of considerable scholarly and political
debate is whether the dramatic change in the power of racism represents a
real defeat or merely, in response to changing circumstances, a tactical
withdrawal from the overt center stage and a redeployment in new dis-
guises, metaphors, and surrogate discourses with the same tired
unreconstructed strategic goals of total racial domination, racialized exclu-
sion, and uncontested normative White supremacy.II
The very existence of this debate goes a long way toward explain-
ing why it is so difficult for Americans to engage in candid and honest
discussions about race across the color line. One of the central reasons that
these discussions are so difficult was eloquently and accurately summa-
rized by the prize winning journalist and essayist Ellis Cose when he
wrote, "What one cannot refute ... is the reality of the perceptual chasm
separating so many blacks and whites. The problem is not only that we are
afraid to talk to one another, it is also that we are disinclined to listen."12
Ellis Cose's perceptive insight reveals that the racial debate in America
today is in many ways truly a discourse with the deaf,13 and thus there are
few reasons to be sanguine about a positive change in this racial commu-
nicative impasse anytime soon. This theme was echoed by former New
York Mayor Ed Koch who presciently observed in a 1992 speech at New
York University that if Americans "are not willing to face up to the im-
portance of who we are and where we come from, we will never have the
candid dialogue and the real [racial] debate we should have."
'1 4
So the question remains: has the lost cause of White supremacy in
America really been lost or has it merely morphed into a modern form of
psychological guerrilla warfare, waged by other more subtle and perhaps
10. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN & SouTH AFRICAN HISTORY xxiv (Oxford Univ. Press 1981) (observing that
"[a]lthough certain kinds of progress have been made in recent years toward resolving the
inequalities that have long existed between whites and blacks in the United States, many
serious problems remain .... ).
11. See id. at xi (defining white supremacy as "the attitudes, ideologies, and policies
associated with the rise of blatant forms of White or European dominance over 'nonwhite'
populations.").
12. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLAsS: WHY ARE MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS
ANGRY? 13 (1993). See also id. at 12 (noting that "Americans are afraid to talk honestly
about race.").
13. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION 169 (1991) (describing
a "dialogue of the deaf" that functions as a "continuation of civil war with other means,"
paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz).
14. See CosE, supra note 12, at 12. See also THERNSTROM & THERNsTRoM, supra note 2,
at 14 (noting that "[t]he topic of race raises fundamental questions about who we are,
where we're going, how we get there.").
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even more effective means?"5 A particularly illuminating example of
America's contemporary ambivalence over the accuracy or exaggeration
of the reports of racism's demise can be seen in the intense and extreme
polarization in the juridical, political, and public debate over the issue of
affirmative action in higher education. This Article finds common cause
with that side of the debate which holds, in short, that racism has not died
either a quiet or ignominious death. It argues, instead, that racism has
merely traded in its old and crude weapons of colonialism, slavery, Jim
Crow segregation, and racial terrorism 16 in exchange for more subtle, and
ultimately more effective, modern, sophisticated weaponry of metaphor,
rhetoric, language, image, denial, and most importantly-perspective.
7
The central argument of this Article is that while the legions of ra-
cism may have been driven from the open and overt battlefield of explicit
public policy and naked sanction of law, they continue to wage the same
war of total racial domination on a covert basis. Under this new strategy,
the forces of racism and White supremacy have redirected their fire from
direct assaults on the public square to the more rugged, entrenched ter-
rain of the hills, valleys, and horizons of the juridical, political, and literary
imagination.' 8 This new form of White supremacy is harder to see than its
15. See Kimber6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988) (observing
that "[tihe end of Jim Crow has been accompanied by the demise of an explicit ideology
of white supremacy. The white norm, however, has not disappeared; it has only been sub-
merged in popular consciousness.").
16. See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 37 (1995) (quoting RICHARD
DYER, WHITE (1997)) (describing "the way whiteness makes its presence felt in black life,
most often as terrorizing imposition, a power that wounds, hurts, tortures .... ). See also
HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
MONTGOMERY xii (1988) (detailing the extent to which "violence in various forms has
been a central ingredient of the Afro-American experience, that the lives of millions of
black people have been and continue to be lived in the shadow of numberless episodes of
racist brutality."); GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGA-
TION IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940 238 (1998) (describing the Southern culture of spectacle
lynchings that drew hundreds and sometime thousands ofjubilant spectators as a form of
public family entertainment, and that even after the period of great spectacle lynching
ended, "whites continued to assert what they thought was their racial right to kill African
Americans, albeit more privately. Private lynchings continued and may even have increased
in the 1930s as some rural white southerners saw the violence as an act of southern patri-
otism.").
17. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 14 (observing the presence of
"linguistic barricades" in the contemporary racial debate and concluding that "[i]n the
battleground of ideas, language is part of the territory each side seeks to capture.").
18. See Thomas Ross, Whiteness After 9/11, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'y 223, 225
(2005) (describing the contemporary anxiety of many White Americans as they "perceive
themselves to be living in an increasingly 'Brown' America in which they will soon be
outnumbered and in which 'being White' is given less overt cultural significance."). See also
GEORGE LIPsITz, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT OF WHITENESS xviii (Temple Univ. Press
1998) (discussing the many ways that Whites now invest in the cash value of Whiteness
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predecessor, and is more difficult to directly engage, as well as being less
amenable to the mobilization of mass public protest; it is precisely for
these reasons that the need for its identification, confrontation, and resis-
tance is more urgent than ever.
19
This Article focuses on affirmative action in higher education as but
one, albeit a particularly illustrative one, of a myriad of examples of the
continued strategic consistency and evolving tactical transformation of
White supremacy. The principle thesis of this Article is that, at its core, the
intense polarization of the debate over affirmative action is less about thesurroate dscouses o " .20 2
surrogate discourses of diversity, candor, and fairness22 and fundamen-
tally more about the racialized perspectival chasm regarding the
and identifying the ways "in which power, property, and the politics of race in our society
continue to contain unacknowledged and unacceptable allegiances to white supremacy");
RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
WHITENESS 205 (1993) (describing the "dualistic discourse on culture" that continue to
maintain White supremacy); MoRISON, supra note 8, at 50-51 (describing the many ways
that whites devised ways to "talk about [race] matters with a vocabulary designed to dis-
guise the subject ... [through a type of] master narrative ... [a] policing narrative" in
which "[s]ilence from and about the [racial] subject was the order of the day.").
19. See Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
1259, 1290 (2004) (observing that White supremacy is now expressed principally in code
words "[b]ecause a strong national antiracism norm has been adopted, any explicit refer-
ence to Whiteness is now frowned upon. For Whiteness to survive as a standard, it must go
undercover."). See also MORRISON, supra note 8, at 63 (observing that "the metaphorical and
metaphysical uses of race occupy definitive places in American literature, in the 'national'
character, and ought to be a major concern .... ); LIPsITz, supra note 18, at 20 (describing
how, in contemporary race relations, "Systemic, collective, and coordinated group behavior
... drops out of sight. Collective exercises of power that relentlessly channel rewards, re-
sources, and opportunities [to whites] ... will not appear 'racist' .... [y]et they ... give
racial identities their sinister social meaning by giving people from different races vastly
different life chances.").
20. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding racial diversity in law
school educational settings as a constitutionally permissible compelling state interest.). But
see Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger, Higher Education Must Keep Its Eyes on the
Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYUJ. PUB. L. 161, 162 (2004) (condemning the diver-
sity rationale of the Grutter decision because "race-based diversity policy promotes notions
of racial superiority and racial inferiority, [and is therefore] inherently flawed."); Charles
Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 931 (2001) (critiquing the liberal defense of affirmative action
based on racial diversity because it was used "without questioning the ways that traditional
admissions criteria continue to perpetuate race and class privilege ... [and has thus]
pushed other, more radical substantive defenses to the background.").
21. See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004). For an incisive critique of Professor Sander's article,
see Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Limits of "A Systematic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools", 7 AFR.-AM. L.& POL'Y REP. 1 (2005).
22. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000) (suggesting a more just way to approach affirmative action
through the use of race-neutral mechanisms that do not trigger strict scrutiny.).
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standpoint from which racial reality is interpreted, articulated, legitimized,
conceived and imagined in juridical, political, and public discourse.
The significance of this racialized perspectival chasm23 was recently
on vivid public national display, and dramatically and tragically illustrated
in the distinctly racialized public reactions to the after-effects of Hurricane
Katrina. 24 During the extensive media coverage of the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Katrina21 in the late summer of 2005, two contrasting media images
from flood-ravaged New Orleans captured the public's imagination and
painfully exposed the stark differences between the White-centered and the
26
Non-White -centered perspective on racial matters in contemporary
23. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 7, at 287 (arguing that "the most arresting
feature of public opinion on race remains how emphatically black and white Americans
disagree with each other.").
24. According to recent national polls, while "six in 10 African Americans say the
fact that most hurricane victims were poor and black was one reason the federal govern-
ment failed to come to the rescue more quickly.Whites reject that idea; nearly 9 in 10 say
those weren't factors." Susan Page & Maria Puente, Views of Whites, Blacks Differ Starkly on
Disaster, U.S.A.ToDAY, Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A.
25. See Anna Mulrine, To the Rescue: After a Sluggish Response, A Rush to Help and
Rebuild, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 12, 2005, at 22 (describing the scene as one
that "didn't look like America.").
26. Following the lead of others, for the balance of this Article I have chosen to use
the term "Non-White" instead of the more popular term of art "people of color" to de-
scribe that category of people that includes, among others, the traditional assortment of
Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans. This choice reflects my concern that, first,
White is a color too. Thus the use of the term "people of color" to describe those who are
not White, simply reinforces in Whites that they are outside of the racial project and the
concept of race does not include them; it reinforces their sense of racelessness and norma-
tivity, which is precisely part of the problem. Therefore, I consider the term to be
ultimately counterproductive.
Secondly, from a political perspective, the termWhite is both a color and a mark of
social, economic, and political power. As one scholar has described it: "white is not just
white, of course. White is also power. And using the terms white/non-white reminds us of
that" SeeJENSEN, supra note 9, at 2. Moreover, I am further persuaded by Jensen's argument
that the only thing that realistically links together those traditionally associated with the
term "people of color" is their "common experience ... of being on the subordinated side
of white supremacy ... and of being targeted, abused, and victimized-albeit in different
ways at different times-by a white-supremacist society." Id. In the absence of that com-
mon experience of victimhood at the hands of White supremacy, the coherence of the
group labeled "people of color vanishes." Id.
I agree with Jensen's observations when he notes that "nothing links [people of
color] except the experience of oppression. And the group perpetrating the oppression is
white, another socially created category defined by power." Id. at 3. So even though this
term has its own drawbacks, most particularly the negative association of being defined by
something that they are not, it does not carry the counterproductive baggage of empow-
ering a White racial abstraction or of turning the focus of the discussion from White
supremacy, the real source of the problem, to the many "varied cultures" and different
cultural experiences of so-called "people of color." Id. at 3.
In the final analysis, I must reluctantly agree with Richard Dyer who writes that
"[w]e need to recognize white as a colour too, and just one among many, and we cannot
SPRING 2006]
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America.27 The day after the catastrophic flooding, Yahoo News published
two pictures of the flood survivors on its website that immediately
sparked a national controversy. 8 The pictures were strikingly similar in
content but were accompanied by starkly different descriptive captions.
In one picture, a young Black man is shown wading through chest-
high water carrying bundles of food in both hands. In the other, two
young Whites, a man and a woman, are shown doing the same. However,
that is where the similarity ends. The captions judgmentally describe the
young Black man as a "looter;" while in sharp contrast, the similarly-
situated Whites are benignly characterized as mere "finders.,
29
The only substantive difference between the two pictures, and
therefore the only basis for the difference in their respective captions, is
the racial identity of their subjects. Through this form of "visual rheto-
ric ' 30 and racialized narrative, the caption characterized the Black man,
solely by virtue of his skin color, as a predator exploiting a tragedy by en-
gaging in the criminal behavior of looting-and thus as morally
blameworthy and deserving of societal condemnation. In contrast, solely
on the basis of their skin color, the caption characterized the White cou-
ple as innocent victims responding to a natural disaster by engaging in the
non-judgmental behavior of "finding"-thus beyond the reach of moral
blameworthiness or condemnation.
The difference in these captions is representative of the negative,
racialized, and stereotypical representations of Blacks in the American
mass media. As David Chaney has accurately observed, such racial
"[r]epresentation[s], far from being pictures of the social world, [are] more
profoundly understood as the endlessly negotiable ways in which the
do that if we keep using a term that reserves colour for anyone other than white people.
Reluctantly, I am forced back onto 'non-white'." See RicARD DYIER,WHITE 11 (1997).
27. See Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 44 (describing "TV
images of hundreds and thousands of people, mostly black and poor, trapped in the shadow
of the Superdome. And most horrific: the photographs of dead people floating facedown in
the sewage or sitting in wheelchairs where they died, some from lack of water.").
28. See Clarence Page, Commentary: When Sluggishness Isn't OK, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4,
2005, § 2, at 9 ("Other e-mailers sent me copies of two news photos that revealed an ap-
parent double standard regarding black and white flood victims in New Orleans.").
29. The actual captions read: "A young man walks through chest deep flood water
after looting a grocery store in New Orleans" and "[t]wo residents wade through chest-
deep water after finding bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina
came through the area in New Orleans." See Aaron Kinney, "Looting" or "Finding"?,
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/09/01/photo-controversy/index-np.htrnl
(2005) (emphasis added). See also Page, supra note 28, 5 2, at 9 (quoting a blogger who
remarked "[a]pparently ... it's not looting if you are white," and noting "[s]uch are the
sentiments and suspicions about race and class that churn just beneath the surface of our
daily discourse.").
30. See DYER, supra note 26, chapter 2, n.4 (describing the "visual rhetoric of white-
ness.").
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world is being constituted and articulated."31 This sort of racialization not
only reflects and constructs public opinion but, also, "provides meaning to
our experiences [and] provides the very terms of [that] experience."
32
The disparity between these conflicting caption descriptions repre-
sents a particularly evocative example of what a recent New York Times poll
described as the "starkly divergent perceptions" between Blacks and
Whites "of many racial issues."3 3 However, the photographers and editors
responsible for the photos have suggested that these widely-circulated
pictures and their divergent captions may have a more racially ambiguous
or even a racially-neutral explanation.34
Notwithstanding the photographers' and editors' alleged racially-
neutral explanations, their justifications are not only unsupported by any
independent corroboration, but the views are themselves the by-products
of their own socially mediated racialized perspectives and interpretations.
More importantly, whatever the veracity of these explanations, there is no
doubt that far more people saw the pictures and their disparate captions
than read the online explanations offered by the publishing news services.
Thus, the impact on the public imagination was affected by the visual
rhetoric of the pictures in ways that, however accurate, written explana-
tions with limited circulation could never significantly ameliorate. Once
these starkly contrasting images were widely publicized, they became a
part of the culture and were in effect "frozen, incapable of growth, change,
innovation or transformation. " ' Given the racialized power of the media
in America, "Racial representations help to mold public opinion, then
hold it in place and set the agenda for public discourse on the race issue
in the media and in the society at large" ' 36 This process is particularly im-
portant in the racial arena because "Black media stereotypes are not the
natural, much less harmless, products of an idealized popular culture, [but]
are more commonly socially constructed images that are selective, partial,
one-dimensional, and distorted in their portrayal of African Americans."
37
31. DAVID CHANEY, THE CULTURAL TURN: SCENE-SETTING ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY 71-72 (Routledge 1994).
32. John 0. Calmore, The Law and Culture-Shift: Race and the Warren Court Legacy, 59
WASH. & LEE L. Riv. 1095, 1106 (2002).
33. Kevin Sack with Janet Elder, The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic Outlook
But Enduring Racial Division, in How RACE Is LIVED IN AMERICA: PULLING TOGETHER,
PULLING APART 365,365 (Time Books 2001).
34. See, e.g., http://www.snopes.com/katrina/photos/looters.asp (citing Kinney, supra
note 29) (suggesting that "the captions were a result of a combination of contextual and
stylistic differences.").
35. Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow, Introduction:A War of Images, in SPLIT IMAGE:
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The "starkly divergent" perceptions of racial reality between Blacks
and Whites exemplified by these now infamous pictures is a powerful re-
flection in a racial context of what Martha Minnow described in the
epigraph to this Article as the distinctions between different "starting
point[s]" or "point[s] of view.'3 Because of America's historical and con-
temporary "stubborn racial divide,,3 9 those starting points are deeply
racially-inflected and the racial perspective of the observer can-and fre-
quently does-have a profound influence on the perception of racial• 40
reality.
In analyzing the issue of affirmative action, this Article argues that
one of the principal reasons for the stark divergence in views between its
supporters and detractors is grounded in the different starting points or
racial perspectives of the observers. The opposition to affirmative action
takes its perspectival bearings from a White-centered "point in space,' 4,
regardless of the individual skin color or racial self-identification of the
persons involved.
This White-centered perspective operates like a powerful mytho-
logical tool that, like a 'virus'[,] ... infects our reasoning and our politics
.... serv[ing] 'not to deny things' but to take the troubling images in our
everyday lives-depictions resonant with our fears, our intolerance, our
bigotry-and make 'them innocent ... give ... them a natural and eternal• • • ,,42
justification. Mythology has always been a powerful force in shaping
and rationalizing any society's view of itself and the world and that has
been particularly true in the context of race.43 Historically, race-based my-
thologies have served what has been described as "the sinister adjective of
the white supremacist, delineating a whiteness that is superior, moral,
38. Minow, supra note 1, at 15.
39. See Calmore, supra note 32, at 1101 (referring to "the reality that we live in a
racist culture.").
40. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that "Opposing
sides in the debate over race start from different premises and see American society
through very different lenses."). See also MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFER-
ENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIIATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 10 (1998) (noting that
"the eye that sees is not a mere physical organ but a means of perception conditioned by
the tradition in which its possessor has been reared."); DYER, supra note 26, at 3 (quoting
Hazel V. Carby, The Multicultural Wars, in BLACK PoPULAR CULTURE 187, 193 (Gina Dent
ed., Seattle Bay Press 1992)) (describing the point of view or starting point of most Whites
in America as proceeding from a" '(White) point in space.' ").
41. DYER, supra note 26, at 3 (quoting Cathy, supra note 40, at 193).
42. MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES: RACE AND THE MYTHS OF WHITENESS 96 (1999)
(quoting POLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES) (1957). See also COLIN FALCK, MYl, TRUTH
AND LITERATiE:TOwARDS A TRUE POST-MODERNISM xii (2d ed. 1995) (arguing for a para-
digm shift in literary and poetic mythologies "which will enable us to restore the concepts
of truth or of vision to our discussions... ").
43. See BERCER, supra note 42, at 97 (noting that "The subject of race, perhaps more
than any other subject in contemporary life, feeds on myth.").
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wholesome, stable, intelligent, and talented and a blackness that is inferior,
stupid, shiftless, lazy, dishonest, untrustworthy, licentious, and violent. 44
The principal purpose of the contemporary American racial myths
surrounding the issue of affirmative action is to act like a "seamless narra-
tive that tells us [that] the contradictioins [sic] and incongruities of race
and racism are too confusing or too dangerous to articulate, 4 either di-
rectly or with too precise a linguistic turn. Such myths provide a type of
"elegant deception" by which the dominant White culture can hide, jus-
tify, and "reinforce ... unconscious prejudices., 46 In short, as Maurice
Berger has argued, "[m]yths are the white lies that tell us everything is all
right, even when it is not.' '41 Similarly, as Peter Fitzpatrick has correctly
observed, the very act of attempting to deny the foundational nature and
impact of race in modern society is itself a myth.48
This Article argues that the central mythological scaffolding upon
which opposition to affirmative action is built is based on a juridical
rhetoric of White innocence. Although this focus is both insightful and
illuminative, a connection between affirmative action and an American
jurisprudential rhetoric of White innocence is neither new nor particu-
larly innovative. A number of insightful scholars have profitably mined this
ground in the past.49 This Article incorporates the insights of these other
important scholars' works and builds upon them in an effort to expose
and undermine more of the bedrock of the "elegant deception" ofWhite
innocence by suturing this rhetoric with the perspectival phenomenon of
the White-centered perspective.
This Article argues that the rhetoric of White innocence as de-
ployed in American affirmative action jurisprudence is not only
philosophically inappropriate, but also constitutes significant constitutional
violations. These violations include, but also go beyond, the traditional
arguments running afoul of the equal protection guarantees of the Four-





48. See PFrER FrLzPVrICK, THE M'TsoLocv OF MODERN LAW ix (1992) (observing
that "[t]he obvious conundrum ... is how this presence of myth can be reconciled with its
denial in modernity.The answer is that the denial is the myth.").
49. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Terms Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARv. L. REv. 78 (1986) (arguing that the emphasis on White innocence establishes a
counterproductive sin based analytical paradigm). See also Thomas Ross, Innocence and Af-
firmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990) (arguing that innocence in affirmative action
jurisprudence conceals an unconscious White racism); Devins, supra note 3, at 16 (arguing
that Thomas Ross' version of the rhetoric of White innocence is more accurately de-
scribed as "the rhetoric of guilt" because it is based on unconscious racism);Thomas Ross,
The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: 4hite Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (1990).
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fundamental breach of the Constitutional principle of due process, both
substantively and procedurally, and amounts to an unprincipled, arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational imposition of racial favoritism.' °
As an analytical vehicle, this Article examines the juridical monop-
oly of the White-centered perspective through the rhetoric of White
innocence as deployed in the Court's jurisprudence on affirmative action
in higher education. Section I examines the phenomenon of the White-
centered perspective and its monopolistic grip on the imagination of the
Supreme Court. Section II situates the content of the ideology of White
innocence within the larger context of the ideology of Whiteness. Sec-
tion III discusses the Court's specific deployment of the ideology of
White innocence as a counterbalance with which to measure the consti-
tutionality of race-conscious affirmative action programs in the context of
higher education. Section IV examines the extent to which the juridical
monopoly of the White-centered perspective, through the deployment of
the rhetoric of White innocence in affirmative action cases, constitutes a
violation of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process. SectionV recommends ways in which the hegemonic grip of the
White-centered perspective can be dismantled, not only in affirmative
action cases but in other racially-inflected constitutional disputes gener-
ally. By supplanting that perspective with a constitutional racial analytic
that appreciates multiple legitimate racial vantage points and perspectives,
the Court may paint a more realistic, more rational, distinctly non-
arbitrary and more balanced picture of the true state of racial reality in
America.
A. The White- Centered Perspective
Although it is rarely noted or emphasized in the contemporary
American racial debate, in many critical and important ways the positions
that Whites and Non-Whites occupy from which they see and interpret
racial reality are worlds apart.5" This is a critical omission in both tone and
emphasis because "at the center of the debate over race in America is the
question of what perspective we will use to define racism and the social
policies necessary to end it. From what vantage point will problems be
named and solutions found?"5 2 The importance of recognizing and interro-
gating the divergences between the White and Non-White perspectives on
race cannot be overemphasized because "defining racism is not a semantic
50. See Charles W. Collier, Affirmative Action and the Decline of Intellectual Culture, 55 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5 (arguing that many different factors can be used as a basis for university
admission "so long as the assessment is not arbitrary or irrational.").
51. See BROWN Fr AL., supra note 6, at 85 (noting the necessity of "finding common
ground to bridge the racial worlds that still divide America.").
52. Id. at 84.
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or theoretical issue,'" 3 but, rather, a very real one that must take into ac-
count practical realities in order to have any meaningful impact on
"bridg[ing] the racial worlds that still divide America. 54
The failure to acknowledge and interrogate the significance of how
racial arguments and conclusions are affected and often even "dictated by
[racialized] vantage point"5' is a critical omission that tends to "naturalize
the racial status quo.' ' 16 In addition, it allows many Whites to see them-
selves as merely innocent observers of the way things just happen to be, 7
and allows them to occupy what Stephanie M. Wildman correctly ob-
serves as "a comfort zone in whiteness, which includes whiteness as the
fabric of daily life for whites" and thus renders them unconnected to and
not responsible for "white participation in the construction of race from a
white-privileged viewpoint.5 18 Consequently, it encourages Whites to see
themselves as racially innocent by engaging in what Rebecca Aanerud has
described as "the false assumption that a white person who does not par-
ticipate in 'extreme' racist acts (e.g. by belonging to a white supremacist
group or subscribing to white supremacist ideology) is not a racist."' 9
The influence of racialized perceptions on reading and interpreting
racial reality is so powerful and pernicious in operation that race itself can
be understood as a type of "habit of perception," ° which, unless actively
guarded against, can become outcome determinative. As Richard Dyer
points out, this racialized mode of perception is fundamentally "inextrica-
ble from racial imagery" and functions as a distortive6' lens through which
reality is perceived that provides the basis for both conscious and uncon-
scious "[racial] judgments ... about people's capacities and worth .... ,62
Therefore, because of America's unique history as an "overtly racist
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 85.
56. Id. at 84. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1662 (1995). (describing how "'the way things are' .. . tends to
make prevailing patterns of race, ethnicity, power, and the distribution of privilege appear
as features of the natural world.").
57. See Stephanie M.Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U.J.L. &
POL'Y 245, 255 (2005) (quoting Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1662) (describing the White
lived experience as "just normal-'the way things are. ").
58. Wildman, supra note 57, at 251. See also John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the
Culture of Segregation: Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1233, 1234 (1995); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1662 (noting how 'the way things are' erases
individual White's sense of personal participation in maintaining White supremacy.).
59. Rebecca Aanerud, Fictions of Whiteness: Speaking the Names of Whiteness in US.
Literature, in DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICIsM 49 (Ruth
Frankenberg ed., 1997).
60. DYER, supra note 26, at 12.
61. See BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 35.
62. DYER, supra note 26, at 1.
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regime, 63 and a "white dominated society' 64 founded on principles of
61White supremacy, the dominant and, thus, default perspective in both
public and private space 66 could accurately be described as White-
centered. Moreover, against this historical backdrop, in all matters bearing
on racial perception, the White-centered or White framed perspective
presumes not only the "power to name" but also the power to "determine
perception, and ultimately, prescription."6 7 In this way, the White-centered
perspective has come to occupy a "privileged strategic location in a racial-
ized social system."
6 8
It is not surprising that race has such a profound effect on the per-
ception of racial reality because, as the nation was starkly reminded by the
two contrasting pictures of the New Orleans flood survivors,69 "Blacks
continue to inhabit a very different America than do Whites" 70 As a result,
"People's perspectives on race reflect their experience on one side of the
color line or the other."71
63. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100-101 (2002) (describ-
ing the American Jim Crow South, South Africa, and Nazi Germany as the only "overtly
racist regimes" because "[n]owhere else were the political and legal potentialities of racism
so fully realized."). See also FREDRICKSON, supra note 10, at xi (noting that "[t]he phrase
'white supremacy' applies with particular force to the historical experience of two na-
tions-South Africa and the United States.").
64. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 34.
65. See FREDRICKSON, supra note 10, at xi (noting that "[t]he phrase 'white suprem-
acy' . .. . refers to the attitudes, ideologies, and policies associated with the rise of blatant
forms of white or European dominance over 'non-white' populations ... based primarily,
if not exclusively, on physical characteristics and ancestry.").
66. See DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, & THE LAW 24 (1998) (describing the influ-
ence of race on "the spatiality of [social] power.").
67. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35.
68. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA 62 (2001) (citing Nicos POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASS
(1982)). See id. at 83, n.16 (noting that the "ideological ensemble of a society" consists of
"racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical structurations").
69. See Page, supra note 28, at 9 ("As the misery mounted, more TV broadcasters
mentioned what viewers could plainly see, that the vast majority of "refugees," were black
and poor."). See also Mulrine, supra note 25, at 22 ("Katrina's lethal one-two punch of 145
mile-per-hour winds and 25-foot storm surge left 90,000 square miles of heartbreak, dev-
astation, and unhinged lives ... [it] uprooted more Americans than the Civil War, the Dust
Bowl storms of the 1930's or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 ... '[t]his is our tsu-
nami.' ").
70. Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race. Consciousness and the Re-
quirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REy. 953, 987 (1992).
71. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35.
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B. The White-Centered Perspective and Judicial Discourse
The presumptive power of the White-centered perspective to de-
termine racial reality is especially important in the language and decisions
of America's judiciary, particularly so in the decisions of the Supreme
Court, because of the critical role of the Court in what David Delaney
has described as "world-making" 7 2 While it is certainly true that "the
politics of world-making ... is inherent in any performance of legal dis-
course," it is particularly critical to keep in mind that "these issues are
sharper in those situations in which the maintenance or transformation of
inherited social hierarchies is precisely the point of contention."
7 3
These are critically important concerns because, as Richard Delgado
has intelligently observed, "traditional legal writing purports to be neutral
and dispassionately analytical, but ... all too often it is not."74 Delgado
argues that part of the reason for this counterfeit neutrality in traditional
legal writing is the fact that "legal writers rarely focus on their own
mindsets, the received wisdoms that serve as their starting points. s7 5 The
"starting points" that Delgado identifies consist of the unstated and unex-
amined racialized vantage points from which legal writers see, interpret,
and make sense of racial reality, directly reflecting the racing characteris-
tics of the society at large which privileges the White way of seeing.
In this way, judicial proceedings at all levels, but especially at the ulti-
mate height of the Supreme Court, can be understood as a "struggle in
which differing, indeed[,j antagonistic world-views confront each other."
7 6
Analyzing juridical decisionmaking and discourse from this perspective
helps to reveal the hidden political dimensions and the racial starting
point from which the Court takes its bearings and perceives racial reality.
As a consequence, this level of inquiry tends to expose the Court's critical
and unstated assumptions where "contingency is portrayed as necessity,
the created is portrayed as the found, the constructed as the natural or the
political as the nonpolitical, and so on.,7 7 For example, the Court's current
obsession to define racism so narrowly as to primarily include only "pur-
poseful individual bigotry ... is highly advantageous for whites" and thus
72. DELANEY, supra note 66, at 23
73. Id.
74. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411,2440-41 (1989).
75. Id.
76. P. Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 830, 837 (1987).
77. DELANEY, supra note 66, at 23-24. See also Bourdieu, supra note 76, at 838-39
(noting that "[1]aw is the quintessential form of symbolic power of naming that creates the
things named, and creates social groups in particular .... It would not be excessive to say
that [legal discourse] creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is the world
that first creates law.").
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reflects a strong and completely arbitrary preference of the White-
centered perspective over all others. The emphasis on intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination by a guilty perpetrator tends to "locate racism in
America's past. It labels black anger and white guilt as equally inappropri-
ate.... [and therefore]renders most whites innocent.,
78
Unfortunately, the distinction between White-centered and Non-
White-centered perspectives on racial reality has rarely been recognized
in the Court's consideration of racial difference. Instead, the Court's "legal
treatment of difference ... tends to treat as unproblematic the point of
view from which difference is seen, assigned, or ignored, rather than ac-
knowledge that the problem of difference can be described and
understood from multiple points of view."79 More importantly, as Martha
Minnow reminds us, the very existence of "multiple viewpoints chal-
lenges the assumption of objectivity and shows how claims to knowledge
bear the imprint of those making the claims."80 Therefore, it is important
to pay careful attention to the way in which the courts generally-and
the United States Supreme Court in particular-treat the issues of racial
difference and perspective in the process of resolving racialized claims of
constitutional rights.
It is critical that the law begin to expressly recognize and confront
the virtual monopoly that the White-centered perspective exerts on the
Supreme Court's view of racial reality in racially-inflected cases bearing
on fundamental constitutional rights. Moreover, such honest and realistic
recognition is essential because, in the final analysis, it is "only by ac-
knowledging [the] profound differences in [racialized] perspectives [that
one] can ... begin to address the durable racial inequality of American
society."8 '
As Malcolm Gladwell has observed, when "reduced to its simplest
elements, even the most complicated of relationships and problems ...
have an identifiable underlying pattern. '8 2 One of the most important and
central "identifiable underlying pattern[s] '8 3 of racial conflict and inequal-
ity in America is due to a fundamental "contradiction of perspectives"
4
78. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 64. See also id. at 64-65 (describing how viewing
"racism as simply the collection of intentionally bigoted individual attitudes is fundamen-
tally flawed, both theoretically and empirically. It uses assumptions that are not supported
by empirical evidence, it ignores the collective dimension of racism, and its conclusions are
dictated by its vantage point.").
79. Minow, supra note 1, at 14.
80. Id. (citing H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 50 (1981)). See also T. NA-
GEL,THEVIEW FROM NOWHERE 7 (1986).
81. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 64.
82. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 141 (Little Brown Publishers 2005).
83. Id.
84. Frances V Rains, Is the Benign Really Harmless? Deconstructing Some "Benign"
Manifestations of Operational White Privilege (citing J.J. Scheurich, Toward a 4hite Discourse on
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on the nature and experience of racial reality in America. It would be a
gross oversimplification to conclude that this fundamental conflict is be-
tween Whites and Non-Whites. Instead, the logic of this argument leads
to the conclusion that the contradiction is based not on the color of one's
skin, but on the color of one's perspectival centeredness or assumptive
racial vantage point. 8s
It has been noted that the central racial paradox of the law in the
twenty-first century consists of reconciling the rival White-centered and
Non-White-centered perspectives regarding the nature of racial reality.
However, at the threshold of this paradox is a candid recognition of the
very existence of a distinction between a White-centered and a Non-
White-centered perspective on racial reality-that there are in fact oppos-
ing perspectives on racial reality that must be reconciled. Dismantling the
monopoly that the White-centered perspective currently enjoys as the
86
presumptive and sole arbiter of racial reality will not be a simple process.
However, it is an essential threshold requirement to achieving meaningful
racial equality because, in a truly pluralistic society, a mere recognition of
the rights of those categorized as "different" is simply not enough. In ad-
dition to such mere recognition, there must also be at least a minimal
degree of respect and dignity afforded to the differences in perspective
that this presumptive position has created and perpetuated.87
The principal argument of this Article is that in resolving competing
racially-inflected claims to constitutional shelter, the Supreme Court's
racial perspective "is unreflectively locked inside its own ... limited ...
experience" 8 ; and, as a consequence, it has consistently chosen to view
racial reality through a "totally white prism," thereby adopting a distinctly
White Racism, Educational Researcher 22, no. 8, 5-10 (1993)), in WHITE REIGN: DEPLOY-
ING WHITENESS IN AMERICA 80, 80 (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., St. Martin's Griffin 1991).
85. See LipsITz, supra note 18, at 20 (noting that "the stark contrast between the
nonwhite experiences and white opinions during the past two decades cannot be attrib-
uted solely to individual ignorance or intolerance, but stems instead from liberal
individualism's inability to describe adequately the collective dimensions of our experi-
ence.").
86. See id. (noting the existence of a "broadly shared narrative about the victimiza-
tion of'innocent' whites by irrational and ungrateful minorities.").
87. The logic of the argument advanced in this Article is premised on the under-
standing that the White-centered perspective is not only raced, but also gendered, classed,
physically-abled, and sexually oriented. Thus, it is a perspective that primarily reflects the
experience of those who are White, male, middle class, fully-abled, and heterosexual. For
purposes of this discussion, I will focus primarily on the raced aspects of this perspective,
but it is important to keep in mind that this analysis could apply with equal force to any of
the other aforementioned categories as well.
88. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35 ("any perspective that is unreflectively
locked inside its own experience is limited, and this is particularly so when that perspec-
tive reflects the dominant culture.").
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White-centered perspective as the "master framework"8 9 or dominant ju-90 91
dicial gaze 9° through which it evaluates racial reality in America.
Moreover, the Court's consistent choice of a White-centered perspective
as the exclusive lens through which to resolve race-based constitutional
claims "cannot be defended as principled, coherent or neutral,' 92 but in-
stead is a social construction which represents little more than the
arbitrary imposition of the judiciary's own personal racial perspective-a
judicial choice, whether conscious our unconscious, but a choice none-
theless.
The choice93 by America's highest legal tribunal to adopt a White-
centered perspective as its presumptive and default lens for evaluating and
resolving racially-inflected constitutional claims is deeply troubling and
problematic on a number of critical levels. In choosing the White-
centered perspective, the Court has completely erased the Non-White-
centered perspective and not only allowed the White-centered perspective
to dominate its thinking, but also to present this perspective as the sole
objective, unraced, and neutral evaluator of the real and the natural.94
This White-centered judicial gaze on America's racial reality is also
problematic for both constitutional and policy reasons. At a minimum,
from a constitutional perspective, whether the result of conscious or
unconscious motivations, the Court's consistent choice of a White-
89. See BONILLA-SILvA, supra note 68, at 63 ("Although all the races in a racialized
social system have the capacity to develop these frameworks, the frameworks of the domi-
nant race become the master frameworks against which all racial actors compare
(positively or negatively) their ideological positions.").
90. See CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
CHRISTIANITY 55 (Westminster John Knox Press 2002)(1982) (describing the "normative
gaze" as an artifact of White supremacy). But see David Theo Goldberg, The Social Forma-
tion of Racist Discourse, in ANATOMY OF RACISM 295, 299 (David Theo Goldberg ed., Univ.
of Minn. Press 1990)(noting that "the metaphors of racist discourse are not reducible to a
single form.").
91. As a result, this unreflective judicial attitude has led the Court to consistently
deny or ignore competing Non-White-centered viewpoints as legitimate bases for either
interpreting or articulating the nature and meaning of racial reality in America.
92. Geoffrey R. Stone, Rehnquist's Legacy Doesn't Measure Up, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6,
2005, § 1, at 17 (summarizing the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on First Amend-
ment cases before the Court during his tenure).
93. The choice of the White perspective is masked in the myth of the absence of
choice. However, whether it is made consciously or unconsciously, a choice is still cer-
tainly being made. See Minow, supra note 1, at 70. See also discussion, infra Section II,
regarding the distinction between conscious and unconscious choices by the Court.
94. SeeJAcoBSON, supra note 40, at 10 (noting that "[t]he awesome power of race as
an ideology resides precisely in its ability to pass as a feature of the natural landscape.").
95. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("We do not recognize the ways in which
our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which
those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces
racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
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centered perspective as the presumptive lens through which to understand
and resolve constitutional race-based claims gives a constitutionally im-
permissible racial preference in favor of Whiteness.96 This impermissible
racial preference represents a one-sided, 97 arbitrary, unprincipled, irra-
tional, capricious, and unexplained judicial choice in stark violation of
both the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
The Court's presumptive choice of the White-centered perspective from
which to consider and resolve race-based constitutional claims, whether
conscious and deliberate or unconscious and unintentional, is constitu-
tionally indefensible and must be expressly and unambiguously rejected as
little more than a measure "designed to maintain White Supremacy."9
More broadly, the Court's choice of the White-centered perspective
is also deeply distressing because, as Martha Minnow reminds us, in a
pluristic society, "Litigation in the Supreme Court should be an opportu-
nity to endow rival vantage points with the reality that power enables, to
redescribe and remake the meanings of difference in a world that has
treated only some vantage points on difference as legitimate."99 Instead of
providing a forum where rival racial vantage points can be evaluated and
measured so as to compete for state recognition and support, the Court's
adoption of the White-centered perspective erases all rival vantage
points' °° and crowns itself as the sole and undisputed interpreter of the
nature and meaning of racial difference that amounts to "a compulsory
gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience."'0 '
When the dominant ideology represented by the White-centered
perspective succeeds in controlling the Court's interpretation and under-
standing of reality, this perspective then controls the production of what
passes for knowledge in a manner that "may even shape the terms of ac-
cess for other points of view, so that exclusions appear natural, based on
merit or on other standards endorsed even by those who remain
96. The central problem with the White-centered perspective is that the Court
mistakes this perspective for the real. The Court forgets that with respect to racial reality,
the White-centered perspective is in dialectical and antinomic opposition to the Non-
White perspective, in that both are in themselves quite reasonable given their respective
starting points.
97. See RiICHARD POSrER, OVERCOMING LAW 373-80 (1995) (accusing Patricia Wil-
liams, in writing The Alchemy of Race and Rights, of"suppress[ing] every perspective other
than that of the suffering, oppressed black" and noting that "one-sidedness is an endemic
risk of the literary depiction of reality, rather than a particular characteristic of Patricia
Williams").
98. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
99. Minow, supra note 1, at 16 (1988).
100. See id. at 53 (noting that "a judicial stance that treats its own perspective as un-
problematic makes other perspectives invisible and puts them beyond discussion.").
101. ERIc SToKEs, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA 302 (1959) (quoting J.
Fitzjames Stephen, Legislation under Lord Mayo, in LIFE OF THE EARL OF MAYO 169 (WW.
Hunter ed., 1876)).
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excluded."'' 2 As deployed by the Court, the White-centered perspective
constitutes a rhetorical narrative that is more than a mere neutral descrip-
tor; rather, it is "determined within a social-cognitive matrix that is
raced" 0 3 and therefore constitutes a rhetorical tool in the classic sense 1
4
that is meant to construct a persuasive and particularized vision of racial
reality. The Court also "wrongly impl[ies] a natural fit with the world"'05
and attempts to persuade both the victims and the beneficiaries that the
presumptive perspective lacks any perspectival particularity at all.'06
I.WHITE INNOCENCE AND THE IDEOLOGY OF WHITENESS
A central analytical support beam in the Court's unacknowledged
reliance on the White-centered perspective in race cases is its use of the
rhetoric ofWhite innocence within the larger context of the ideology of
Whiteness itself.'0 7 For this reason, interrogating the meaning, significance,
and implications of the Court's adoption of the White-centered perspec-
tive as its presumptive measure of racial difference requires a careful
examination of the relationship between the ideology of White inno-
cence within the larger framework of Whiteness. 108
102. See Minow, supra note 1, at 67. Minow elaborates by observing that:
Ideological success is achieved when only dissenting views are regarded as
ideologies; the prevailing view is the truth. Those who win a given struggle
for control have the best access to the means of producing knowledge, such
as the mass media and schools .... Historians have described how a concep-
tion of reality when it triumphs, convinces even those injured by it of its
actuality. Accordingly, political and cultural success itself submerges the fact
that conceptions of reality represent a perspective of some groups, not a pic-
ture of reality free from any perspective.
Id. (internal citations omitted)
103. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 73 (2002).
104. See ARISTOTLE,THE ART OF RHETORIC 70 (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991).
105. Minow, supra note 1, at 13.
106. Id. at 67.
107. See id. Another writer suggests:
The concept of "ideology" reflects the one discovery which emerged from
political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so
intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able
to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There
is implicit in the word "ideology" the insight that in certain situations the
collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of soci-
ety both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it.
KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 36 (L.Wirth & E. Shils trans., 1936).
108. See Amanda E. Lewis, Some Are More Equal than Others: Lessons on Whiteness from
School, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINULNG SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 159, 161 (Ashley W
Doane & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., Roudedie 2003) (notina that "it is particularlv im-
portant to understand the parameters and functions of whiteness, [and] of what it means
to say someone is white.").
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In any analysis which critiques an important facet of Whiteness, it is
important to keep in mind the critical admonition articulated by historian
David Roediger that Whiteness is not merely a skin color; it is also an
"ideology" that was "developed out of desires to rule and the exigencies of
ruling."'0 9 Critical to these demands of ruling was the need to justify, both
to the ruled and the rulers, the hegemonic grip of exclusively White rule
in terms that appeared to be more than the mere naked imposition of raw
military and technological power. Inherent in notions of Whiteness are
also notions of "innocence" that suggests that White rule is not merely the
result of outside imposition by force; rather, it is a natural consequence of
racial, moral, and biological superiority of Whiteness itself.White rule was
a natural function of nature and not the brute consequences of unbridled
political power. In this way, the ideologies of Whiteness and White inno-
cence were born together as mutually-dependant concepts."0 Thus, the
ideology of White innocence is not only derivative from the ideology of
Whiteness, but also, like Whiteness itself, it is "a peculiar institution""' that
is a deeply schizophrenic and inconsistent mix of both colorblind and
color-conscious values, understandings, and perspectives."
2
From this central position in society, the essential principles
of the ideology of White innocence strongly correlate with what
has variously been described as a "new racism, ' 13 a "neo-con ' 14 or
109. DAVID R. R.OEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: TRANSCENDING THE RAcIAL PAST 23 (2002)
("Perhaps the overarching theme in scholarship on whiteness is the argument that white
identity is decisively shaped by the exercise of power and the expectation of advantages in
acquiring property."). See also, LtpsiTz, supra note 18, at viii (offering the admonition that "I
hope it is clear that opposing whiteness is not the same as opposing white people. White
supremacy is an equal opportunity employer; nonwhite people can become active agents of
white supremacy as well as passive participants in its hierarchies and rewards.").
110. See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 68, at 63 (noting that "a more fruitful approach
for examining individual racial views is the notion of racial ideology, or the racially based
frameworks used by actors to explain and justify (the dominant race) or challenge (subor-
dinate race or races to) the racial status quo."). See also Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the
Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295,
314 (1988) ("Central to my new array of insights was that law and rights might be better
understood not [merely] as functional, responsive and autonomous expressions of shared
values or emerging egalitarian norms, but instead as ideology.").
111. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 68, at 137. See also THEODORE ALLEN, THE INVENTION
OF THE WHITE RACE,VOL. 1 (1994).
112. SeeJACOBSON, supra note 40, at 5 (noting that "The contest over whiteness-its
definition, its internal hierarchies, its proper boundaries, and its rightful claimants-has
been critical to American culture throughout the nation's history, and it has been a fairly
untidy affair.").
113. Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism, 15 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 245, 247
(1996) (describing the new racism as "a way of thinking that has become fashionable and
acceptable in some quarters [that] (1) denies the history of racial oppression in America;
(2) rejects biological racism in favor of an attack on black culture; and (3) supports formal,
de jure equality .... ).
114. This is a reference to the neo-conservative view of the far right of the political
divide.
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neo-confederate' s racism, or a new "conservative ... racial realism."" 6 For
this reason, the ideology of White innocence may either be deployed in-




A. Defining White Innocence
The essential principles of White innocence also strongly correlate
with the various major dictionary definitions of the term "innocence"
generally. First, the term innocence is primarily defined "in a narrow, even,,,,119
technical way as simply being "not guilty of a crime or offense." 9 This
is the primary, narrowest, and most technical definition of the term inno-
cence, and connotes a legalized sense of having been wrongly accused or
adjudicated as guilty of some specifically charged crime or offense. Second,
"'[I]nnocence' can also take on a larger meaning that extends beyond tech-
nicality into morality: 'freedom from sin, guilt, or moral wrong in general;
the state of being untainted with, or unacquainted with, evil; moral pu-
rity,' ,120 or of being "'free of responsibility' or moral blameworthiness for
115. See generally PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING: How THE SOUTH IS SHAPING
AMERICAN VALUES, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 136 (1996).
116. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. Brown describes the central organizing claims
of"racial realists" as consisting of.
three related claims. First, ... America has made great progress in rectifying
racial injustice [and that] .... the economic divide between whites and
blacks ... is exaggerated, and white Americans have been receptive to de-
mands for racial equality .... [Their] second claim is that persistent racial
inequalities ... cannot be explained by white racism .... As they see it, the
problem is the lethargic, incorrigible, and often pathological behavior of
people who fail to take responsibility for their own lives [and are] .... attrib-
utable to the moral and cultural failure of African Americans, not to
discrimination .... [Third], the civil rights movement's political failures are
caused by the manipulative, expedient behavior of black nationalists and the
civil rights establishment.
Id. at 6-7.
117. See Finkelman, supra note 113.
118. Seth D. Harris, Innocence and the Sopranos, 49 N.YL ScH. L. REV. 577, 577
(2005)(quoting OxroRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 995 (2d ed. 1989)) ("freedom from specific
guilt; the fact of not being guilty of that which one is charged; guiltlessness.").
119. THE NEw OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIoNARY 875 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank
Abate eds., 2001). The sense of innocence as being not guilty or wrongfully accused is
poignantly illustrated in the recent popularity of "innocence projects" which have evolved
all over the country, whereby defendants on death row have been freed (some, after long
years of confinement) based on DNA technology that was not available at the time of
their original trial and conviction.
120. Harris, supra note 118, at 577 (quoting THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 995
(2d ed. 1989)). See id. at 578 ("It bestows no special legal status.Yet, it is a positive attribute
with normative consequences.").
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something, yet nonetheless "suffering [the] consequences,"'12of guilt despite
being not guilty of the offence. The third definition of innocence is un-
derstood to describe those who are naive, unaware, uninitiated, weak or
vulnerable. 122
As one scholar has observed, there is a fourth alternative definition
of innocence that "conveys a larger idea that is more powerful than the
former's narrow literalism.' 23 In this more expansive view, innocence
"evokes the sleeping infant, wholly dependant and pure of thought and
deed. No avoidable harm can be justifiably inflicted on this type of'inno-
cent.' ,,124 In fact, this type of innocence imposes demands on others to
"receive care and protection from harm. ' 125 Thus, this expansive moral
dimension of innocence "is not a passive state" but, rather, "includes the
power to command others to action-that is, to require the care and pro-
tection of those deemed innocent.
12 6
Under the ideology of White innocence as conceived by this Article,
there are four principal ways in which Whiteness reflects and reinscribes
notions of innocence. First, Whiteness is regarded as innocent of race it-
self. Second, Whiteness is considered to be innocent of racial perspective.
Third, Whiteness insists that it is innocent of racism. Fourth, Whiteness
argues that it is innocent of racial benefit from the legacy of American
racism.
1. Innocent of Race
Despite the overwhelming rejection by the scientific and academic
community of the notion of biological racial essentialism 27 and the wide-
spread acceptance of race as nothing more than a social construct, 128 it is
important to note that Whiteness is not accurately regarded as a "singular
121. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Harris, supra note 118, at 577.
124. Id. at 578.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 580.
127. See ABBY L. FERBER, WITE MAN FALLING: RACE, GENDER, AND WHITE SUPREM-
ACY 19 (1998) (quoting Ken Clatterbaugh, Mythopoetic Foundations and New Age Patriarchy,
in THE POLITICS OF MANHOOD (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1995)) (defining racial essentialism
"as the assumption that 'social differences such as those between men and women, people
of different races, or social classes are due to intrinsic biological or psychic differences' ...
[that] are believed to be innate and unchanging.").
128. See Ruth Frankenberg, The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness, in THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF WHITENESS 72 (Rasmussen et al. eds., 2001)(citing Becky Thompson
and Sangeeta Tyagi, Storytelling as Social Conscience: The Power ofAutobiography, in NAMES WE
CALL HOME: AUTOBIOGRAPHY ON RACIAL IDENTITY 11-18 (Thompson & Tyagi eds.,
1996)). See also Aanerud, supra note 59, at 36-37 (defining Whiteness as a "socially and
historically constructed category of racial identity").
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entity, existing prior to or apart from other categories of identities.
[Instead,] [i]ts formation depends on the changing relations of gender,
class, sexuality, and nationality."'' 29 As a consequence, Whiteness should be
regarded more like a historical process3 0 that "signals the production and
reproduction of dominance rather than subordination, normativity rather
than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage."' 3' From a White-
centered perspective, the ideology of White innocence reflects a continuing
sense of real, socially meaningful, essential, biological differences between
different racial groups. As one scholar has noted, the White-centered per-
spective tends
to think of race as being indisputable, real. It frames our no-
tions of kinship and descent and influences our movements in
the social world; we see it plainly on one another's faces. It
seems a product not of the social imagination but of biology.
132
From the Non-White-centered perspective, "While the history of the
scientific concept of race argues that race is an inherent essence, it reveals,
on the contrary, that race is a social construct.'' 33 The deep-seated White-
centered notion of racial essentialism "cannot be supported" because
"while our commonsense assumptions may tell us that race is rooted in
biology, biologists today reject such notions.'' 34 The claim of Whiteness as a
form of personal identity'35 is a relatively recent historical phenomenon 36
129. Aanerud, supra note 59, at 37.
130. See Frankenberg, supra note 18, at 193.
131. Id. at 236-37.
132. JACOBSON, supra note 40, at 1.
133. FERBER, supra note 127, at 33.
134. Id. at 19 (citing Jonathan Marks, Black, White, Other, 103 NATuRAL HISToRY 32,
32-35 (Dec. 1994)). See also FERBER, supra note 127, at 19 ("Racial categories lack any
scientific foundation; there is greater genetic variety within racial groups than between
them, and racial classifications vary both cross-culturally and historically").
135. See AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 2 (2003) (arguing that "mutual
identification ... [in] identity groups .... is basic to human existence .... ). Cornel West
describes personal identity:
Identity has to do with protection, association and recognition. People iden-
tify themselves in certain ways in order to protect their bodies, their labor,
their communities, their way of life; in order to be associated with people
who ascribe value to them, who take them seriously, who respect them; and
for purposes of recognition, to be acknowledged, to feel as if one actually be-
longs to a group ....
See CORNEL WEST,THE CORNEL WEST READER 501 (1999).
136. See Ruth Frankenberg, Local Whitenesses, Localizing Whiteness, in DISPLACING
WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 9 (Ruth Frankenberg ed., 1997)
(noting that "'Race' is, in fact, a rather recent phenomenon; the hierarchal ranking of
'peoples' is a much older measuring instrument in the Western lexicon of supremacism.").
[VOL. 11:477
The Color of Perspective
and is heavily "veiled in value."13 7 The notion of a personal White identity
is also a uniquely Western' 38 conflation of diverse European national eth-
nicities into a relatively recent and socially-constructed race-based claim
of group identity. 39 Additionally, this is not a positive claim about what
one is, but rather a negative claim grounded on what one is not.4° To be
White necessarily implies a claim of racial purity.'4 It is effectively a
137. See Goldberg, supra note 90, at 301.
138. One scholar observes:
"West" and "Western" are relational terms constructed out of opposition to
non-Western Others or "Orientals." Westerness implies a particular, domina-
tive relationship to power, colonial expansion, a belonging to center rather
than margin in a global capitalist system, and a privileged relationship to in-
stitutions ... for the production of knowledge.
See FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at 265 n.2 (1993).
139. See FERBER, supra note 127, at 33 ("While the history of the scientific concept of
race argues that race is an inherent essence, it reveals, on the contrary, that race is a social
construct."). See also Frankenberg, supra note 136, at 9.
On "Black-Brown Relations" Professor Klor de Alva observes, in a conversation
with Cornel West, that:
We have, in the United States, two mechanisms at play in the construction of
collective identities. One is to identify folks from a cultural perspective. The
other is to identify them from a racial perspective. Now, with the exception
of black-white relations, the racial perspective is not the critical one for most
folks. The cultural perspective was, at one time, very sharply drawn .... But
in the twentieth century, we have seen in the United States a phenomenon
that we do not see anyplace else in the world-the capacity to blur the dif-
ferences between these cultural groups, to construct them in such a way that
they become insignificant and to fuse them into a new group called Whites,
which didn't exist before.
See CORNEL WEST, supra note 135, at 503. Professor West responds to Klor de Alva's obser-
vation, stating that
part of the tragedy of American civilization is precisely the degree to which
the stability and continuity of American democracy has been predicated on a
construct of whiteness that includes the subordination of black people, so
that European cultural diversity could disappear into American whiteness
while black folk remain subordinated.
Id. See also FRANKENBERG, supra note 136, at 9 (noting that "whiteness is a construct or
identity almost impossible to separate from racial dominance.").
140. See Tayyab Mahmud, Genealogy of a State-Engineered "Model Minority": "Not
Quite/Not 1hite" South Asian Americans, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 657, 660-61 (2001) (review-
ing VIjAY PRAsIAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOiK (2000)) (citing Jean-Paul Sartre, in Preface
to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 38 (1963)). See also VG. KIERNAN, THE
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claim 1 42 of being free from even "one drop" of Black, African or impure
non-White blood in one's ancestral chain of racial title. 14 3 In short, a claim
of personal Whiteness is tantamount to a claim of being innocent of
Blackness.
[T]he project of defining races always involves drawing and maintaining
boundaries between those races .... From the moment the concept of race
was invented, interracial sexuality became a concern .... Historically, the
preoccupation with defining who is white and who is black superseded con-
cern with defining other nonwhites. The history of slavery and Jim Crow
segregation depended upon firm knowledge of who was white and black for
their support.
See FERBER, supra note 127, 33-34. See also id. at 41 (quoting F JAMES DAvIS, WHO IS
BLA CK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 17 (1991)) (finding "'the tragedy of miscegena-
tion'[was that] .... [e]very form of political and economic equality for blacks [had been]
depicted as a threat to white racial purity, responded to with fears of interracial sexuality,
and argued against on this basis.").
142. Such contemporary claims, although common among those who consider
themselves to be White, are inherently unprovable beyond more than two or three genera-
tions in the vast majority of cases. At best, in many such cases these claims rest on little
more than a mere hunch, hope, or prayer based on the perceived White physical character-
istics of only a few generations.
143. See FERBER, supra note 133, at 23 ("[T]he historical construction of the opposi-
tion white/black involves defining the limits of whiteness and blackness and defining
precisely who qualifies as white and who qualifies as black. In order to produce whiteness
as a stable, natural, given identity, the boundaries of whiteness must be specified and se-
cured."). See also id. at 35 (asserting that "states moved even further toward the one-drop
rule, which defined as black all those with one discernable drop of black blood."); id. at 43
(noting that "While a great deal has changed over the past three decades, the one-drop
rule is still generally accepted, and interracial unions remain controversial and uncom-
mon."); id. at 41-42 (quoting DAVIS, supra note 141, at 72-73) (noting that interracial
Black/White marriages are still relatively rare and that "such marriages consistently repre-
sent only 1 to 2 percent of all marriages."); WEST, supra note 135, at 501; THERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 527 ("It is startling that until 1989 our birth registration
rules provided that the child of a white husband and a black wife counted as 'black,' and so,
too, did the child of a black husband and a white wife .... It was the 'one drop of blood'
..... ). Another scholar describes the federal guidelines outlined by the National Center
for Health Statistics used between 1950 and 1989 for birth certificate race-identification
records:
'[Ijn cases of mixed parentage where only one parent was white, the child
was assigned to the other parent's race. When neither parent was white, the
child was assigned to the race of the father . . . .' One notable characteristic is
that any coupling between Whites and non-Whites was deemed to produce
non-White children. White racial status could only be removed by inter-
group parentage, never gained.
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious
Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1257-58 (1994) (quoting National Ctr. for Health Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Advance Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1989,
MONTHLYVITAL STAT. Rp.,Jan. 7, 1992, at 50).
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Because, by definition, claims of personal Whiteness necessarily in-
voke claims of purity, such claims require constant attention to "policing
of the borders [and] maintenance of the boundaries between 'one's own
kind' and others."'1" As Iris Marion Young has observed, "Any move to
define an identity, a closed totality, always depends on excluding some
elements, separating the pure from the impure .... the logic of identity
seeks to keep those borders firmly drawn.'
'14
1
Thus, a claim of personal Whiteness is not only paradoxically a claim
of being "pure" or uncontaminated by Blackness, but also of actually tran-
scending race or being innocent of race itself. However, this
transcendence notwithstanding, most people who regard themselves as
White 146 are deeply invested in their Whiteness because it is "an identityS ,,147
that provides them with resources, power, and opportunity. Despite this
investment, they are also simultaneously and schizophrenically deeply in
denial regarding the racially-contingent basis of their identity. Just as men
have difficulty imagining themselves "as having gendered identities, " '"
many Whites have similar difficulty seeing themselves as raced and having
racial identities in American society.
Most Whites are conditioned not to view themselves in racial terms;
instead, they believe that "race is something that doesn't affect Whites."'4 9
Under this logic, race is something that affects racial minorities like
Blacks, Latinos, Asians, or American Indians, but not Whites. 50 Whiteness
and its attendant privileges are something that members of the dominant
group are "taught not to recognize.'"' As Richard Dyer has poignantly
observed, "As long as race is something only applied to non-white peo-
ples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we
function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we are just people.'
1 2
144. FERBER, supra note 127, at 23-24.
145. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 303 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
146. ROEDIGER, supra note 109. See also id. at 124 (noting that "a substantial African
American tradition [exists] that regards terror and complicity in terror as the glue binding
together those who think that they are white.").
147. LIPSITZ, supra note 18, at vii.
148. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming
to See Correspondences through Work in Women's Studies, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING
BEHIND THE MIRROR, 291,297 (Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
149. MELANIE E. L. BUSH, BREAKING THE CODE OF GOOD INTENTIONS: EVERYDAY
FoRms orWHIENESS 222 (2004).
150. Lewis, supra note 108, at 165 (reflecting on a conversation with a White woman
who appeared "not [to] have a coherent or self-conscious identity as a white person. As far
as she was concerned, race was about others."); id. at 161 ("[M]any whites do not neces-
sarily recognize their own status as racial actors or consciously identify as belonging to a
racial group.").
151. McIntosh, supra note 148, at 291.
152. DYER, supra note 26, at 1.
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As a consequence of Whites not seeing themselves as being raced
within Western culture, as standing for the "human norm," they are
thereby able to "claim to speak for the commonality of humanity." 1 3 The
claim of Whiteness to speak for all of humanity is sui generis because
"[r]aced people can't do that-they can only speak for their race. But




Whiteness is thus thought of as coterminous with being "just hu-
man ... which is not far off from saying that whites are people whereas
other colours are something else ... [an assumption] endemic to white
culture."' -" Because most Whites see themselves as just people without a
conscious racial identity, this gives rise to a sense of being innocent of
race that is uncomfortably disturbed when Whites are reminded that they
are White. For example, bell hooks has noted "how amazed and angry
white liberals become when attention is drawn to their whiteness, when
they are seen by non-white people as white.,11
6
2. Innocent of Racial Perspective
Since most Whites do not conceive of themselves in racialized
terms, they consider their perspective to be an equally unraced and objec-
tive report of reality, especially racial reality. Moreover, since Whites see
Whiteness as the norm, Non-Whites "are defined as deviating from that
norm.7 Whites see Whiteness as real and Non-Whites as somehow not
real or certainly less real. Under this logic, since Whites are the only "real"
people, it follows that their perceptions of racial reality are the only real
ones as well.""
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (summarizing an account from bell hooks, Madonna or Soul Sister? And Repre-
sentations of Whiteness in the Black Imagination, in BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION
167 (1992)). Dyer subsequently quotes bell hooks:
Often their rage erupts because they believe that all ways of looking that
highlight difference subvert the liberal belief in a universal subjectivity (We
are all just people) that they think will make racism disappear. They have a
deep emotional investment in the myth of 'sameness', even as their actions
reflect the primacy of whiteness as a sign informing who they are and how
they think.
Id. (quoting hooks, supra note 178)
157. Rains, supra note 84, at 80 (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., St. Martin's Griffin
1991) (quoting KATHERINE WEILER, WOMEN TEACHING FOR CHANGE: GENDER, CLASS AND
POWER 76-77 (1988)).
158. See Wildman, supra note 57, at 257 (2005) (quoting STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN
WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & TRINA GRILLO,
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 91 (1996)) (not-
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This socially-constructed racial identity of being real forms what
Peggy McIntosh has described as "a base of unacknowledged ... unearned
... skin privilege"'' 9 which she describes as being "like an invisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides,
codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank
checks.' 160 Because these privileges go unspoken, they are invisible 16' but
nonetheless palpably clear, real and indicative of a racially and "arbitrarily
conferred dominance."'162 Both Whiteness and the ideology of White in-
nocence are in plain sight while simultaneously totally invisible.
The invisibility of Whiteness allows the Supreme Court to deploy
the rhetorical narrative of White innocence as a kind of "semantic
code' ' 163 that supplies a moral armor thorough which the Court can ap-
pear to measure constitutionality under what seem to be praiseworthy
and ostensibly racially-neutral standards; but which are, in reality, deeply
racialized. Not only does the analysis proceed exclusively from the White
vantage point, but the standards the Court adopts also serve to protect,
perpetuate, and rationalize the existing extreme disequilibrium of power,
wealth, and access to the good things in life under the racial status quo.1
64
ing that "Members of dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the pertinent
perceptions, that their problems are the problems that need to be addressed, and that in
discourse they should be the speaker rather than the listener."). See also McIntosh, supra
note 148, at 292; DYER, supra note 26, at 9.
159. McIntosh, supra note 148, at 292.
160. Id. at 291.
161. Id. (describing how White privilege is invisible only to Whites, but not in any
way invisible to Non-Whites). Ruth Frankenberg observes that
the notion that whiteness [as] unmarked norm is revealed to be a mirage, or
at least a phenomenon delimited in time and space .... it is only in those
times and places where white supremacism has achieved hegemony that
whiteness attains ... unmarkedness .... In times and places when whiteness
and white dominance are being built or reconfigured, they are highly visible,
and asserted, rather than invisible or simply "normative."
Frankenberg, supra note 136, at 5.
162. McIntosh, supra note 148, at 296. See id. at 296-97 ("some of the power which I
originally saw as attendant on being a human being in the U.S. consisted in unearned ad-
vantage and conferred dominance, as well as other kinds of special circumstances not
universally taken for granted.").
163. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Dis-
course Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REv. 77,78 (2000).
164. See DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIsT CurrTutn 42 (Blackwell 1993) (noting that,
"the law, moral discourse, and the social sciences can thus silently incorporate racialized lan-
guage ... as the preconceptual elements of racialized discourse, while claiming to be
antiracist."). See also Peter Fitzpatrick, Racism and the Innocence of Law, in CITICAL LEGAL
STuDIEs 119, 120 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., Basil Blackwell 1987) ("That is, the
form both substitutes for explicit racism and provides a means of asserting that what is in-
volved is not racism but something different."); CAss R. SUNSmIN, THE PARTIAL
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White innocence constitutes a type of magic amulet contained in the "in-
visible knapsack"1 65 of White privilege with which Whites can ward off
the dark forces of responsibility for the creation and perpetuation of the
many inequalities, burdens, and benefits of the current racial status quo in
America.
The rhetorical narrative of White racial innocence constitutes an
important and obvious, but also an effectively hidden pillar of the racial
status quo that Cass Sunstein calls "the baseline for assessing neutrality."'6
From this perspective, any disturbance in the existing racial prerogatives,
preferences, and advantages of so-called innocent Whites as a group, is
regarded as a "departure from the status quo" and, thus, "signals partisan-
ship" while "respect for [this] status quo signals neutrality."'' 67 As a result,
the White-centered perspective is able to claim that it does not have a
racial vantage point, and in so doing, "perpetuates the mythology of [the]
neutral observers.',
168
Similar to Sunstein's observations, Martha Minow observes that the
"unstated assumption" of a White racialized standpoint of the status quo
can "so entrench one point of view as natural and orderly that any con-
scious decision to notice or to ignore difference breaks the illusion of a
legal world free of perspective.' 6' Like Sunstein, Minow also argues that
these unstated and deeply racialized assumptions "make it seem that de-
partures from unstated norms violate commitments to neutrality. Yet
adhering to the unstated norms undermines commitments to neutrality-
and to equality.
'70
Of course, the hard truth is that Whiteness is not a racially neutral
lens through which to gaze at the world of racial reality. Instead, White-
ness has a distinct racialized "standpoint [or] location from which to see
CONSTITUTION 6 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); GuNNA MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
218 (1962).
165. McIntosh, supra note 148, at 291.
166. Cass Sunstein notes:
More Broadly: A decision to use the status quo as the baseline would be en-
tirely acceptable if the status quo could be independently justified. In many
contexts, however, the status quo should be highly controversial as a matter
of both principal and law. Respect for the existing distributions is neutral
only if existing distributions are themselves neutral.
When the status quo-between, say, rich and poor, or blacks and whites, or
women and men-is itself a product of law and far from just, a decision to
take it as a baseline for assessing neutrality is unjustifiable.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 6.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Minow, supra note 1, at 47. See id. at 48 ("no objective perspective exists free
from the particular viewpoint of the observer.").
169. Minow, supra note 1, at 57-58.
170. Id.
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[itself] ... and national and global others."'171 Failing to acknowledge the
"unstated assumption" of this White standpoint, or the White "point in
space" that constitutes the source of the White vantage point, has highly
negative consequences. As Martha Minow has observed, "Veiling the
standpoint of the observer conceals its impact on our perception of the
world .... [and] leads to the next unstated assumption: that all other per-
spectives are either presumptively identical to the observer's own or are
irrelevant."17 2 This is particularly important in the context of the judicial
function because, as Minow goes on to explain, "[A] judicial stance that
treats its own perspective as unproblematic makes other perspectives in-
visible and puts them beyond discussion."'
73
3. Innocent of Racism
From the White-centered perspective, racism in America is consid-
ered to be such an artifact of America's ancient past that it has moved one
commentator speaking from that vantage point to claim that "the blood
of slavery does not stain modern mainstream America."'1 4 Freed from the
"stain" of slavery, some scholars have argued that White racial attitudes in
America have improved and "transformed" so dramatically that although
"[w]hites with a pathological hatred of African Americans can still be
found .... the haters have become a tiny remnant with no influence in
any important sphere of American life."' 75 As a result, a significant theme
among scholars who speak from a White-centered perspective is the con-
clusion: "[alt least when it comes to questions of public policy, [that] few
whites are now racists."' 76 From this perspective, because most Whites are
no longer guilty of racism (with the exception of a few fringe outliers);
they-and thus Whiteness itself-must be considered innocent of racism.
a. A Discredited View of Racism
From the "innocent of racism" perspective, the continuing presence
of "racial incidents ... demonstrate" that a few isolated "bigots and insti-
tutional failures still exist; however, they do not indicate that racism is a
171. Frankenberg, supra note 128, at 76. See id. (noting that "Whiteness is a location
of structural advantage in societies structured in racial dominance.").
172. Minow, supra note 1, at 50. See also id. at 51, n.199 ("Feminist theorists have
tried to articulate, in theoretical terms, the bases for a 'standpoint,' a perspective grounded
in experience that sheds contrasting light on prevailing constructions of reality.").
173. Id. at 53.
174. BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 36.
175. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 500. See id. at 533 (noting that
"to stress the bad news is to distort the picture, however. Equally important is the story
of enormous change .....
176. Id.
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systemic problem.' 7 7 Significantly, this view of the innocence of White-
ness is only possible through the filtering of "evidence and ... judgment
through an outdated, discredited understanding of racism.' 78 This discred-
ited view is premised on the assumption that racism in contemporary
America consists of acts which are "intentional, obvious and individual."'
179
The "innocent of race" view is based on "a particular understanding of
racism ... [that] assumes that racism is motivated, crude, explicitly su-
premacist and typically expressed as individual bias. '"'8
This perspective regards racism to be the result of intentional indi-
vidual behavior that is both conscious and knowing in order to satisfy a
personal racial animus and taste for discrimination that is manifested by
either formal or explicit barriers to access based on racial categorization.
It ignores the fact that "white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct,
referential, and snarling contempt than a system for protecting the privi-
leges of whites by denying communities of color opportunities for asset
accumulation and upward mobility''
b. The End of Racism
Through the White-centered perspective, a great many Whites and
Non-Whites have adopted a form of American color blindness that holds:
"[e]xcept for vestigial pockets of historical racism, any possible connec-
tion between past racial subordination and the present situation has been
severed by the formal repudiation of old race-conscious policies.' ' 2 These
modern "apostles" in the faith of colorblindness advocate a perspective on
race that "insist[s] that racism is primarily a thing of the past.'
'18 3
Central to the ideology of White innocence is the notion that "ra-
cism has been eradicated" by the actions of civil rights laws that struck
177. Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2253, 2255 (1993).
178. BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 35.
179. Observers note:
Many White Americans and American institutions, including the current Su-
preme Court majority, hold parallel views. Because racial conservatives
ignore the variability of racial reality in America, they do not recognize that
racism is lodged in the structure of society, that it permeates the workings of
the economic, political, educational, and legal institutions of the United
States.
Id. at 35-36.
180. Id. at 37.
181. LiPsITZ, supra note 18, at viii. See generally Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 H~Auv. L. Rnv. 1707 (1993).
182. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1379.
183. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35.
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down "legal segregation and outlaw[ed] discrimination."'' 84 The elimina-
tion of these formal barriers to racial equality has spawned a cult of "color
blindness" in which the presumed "race neutrality of the legal system cre-
ates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for
the condition of the Black underclass .... "'8' The continuance of racial
inequality is no longer blamed on the biological racial inferiority of Non-
Whites but rather on Black cultural inferiority.86
Similarly, not only do most Whites consider themselves to be per-
sonally innocent of racism, but in national terms, recent surveys reveal that
"[a] majority of whites indicate that they do not see U.S. society as fun-
damentally racist or still pervaded by widespread discrimination."8 7 In
fact,
[F]rom this perspective, many whites believe that the 1960s
civil rights laws took care of most serious racial discrimination
.... [and] the majority of whites see the U.S. social system as
fair and egalitarian, and some get angry that black Americans
do not see the country in the same way.188
Not only do most Whites think that racial discrimination against Blacks is
largely a thing of the past, "Even more striking, perhaps is the fact that a
majority of whites do not see the centuries of slavery and segregation as
bringing whites substantial socioeconomic benefits. ' "' 9
This White-centered view of the nature of racism reflects what Alan
Freeman has characterized as a move from a "victim perspective" to a
"perpetrator perspective."' 90 As the labels imply, the victim perspective
184. Id. at 1 (noting that "if vestiges of racial inequality persist, they believe that it is
because Blacks have failed to take advantage of opportunities created by the civil rights
revolution. In their view, if Blacks are less successful than Whites, it is not because America
is still a racist society.").
185. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1383.
186. See id. at 1379 ("The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordina-
tion based on a belief in racial inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the
domination of Blacks through reference to an assumed cultural inferiority."). See also id.
(citing THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984)) ("Culture not race,
now accounts for this 'otherness."'.). See generally THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note
2.
187. JOE FEAGIN & EILEEN O'BRIEN, WHITE MEN ON RACE: POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND
THE SHAPING OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS 19 (Beacon Press 2003).
188. Id. at 14-15. See also id. ("one recent Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard survey
found that a substantial majority of whites felt that African Americans had societal oppor-
tunities that were equal to, or better than, those of whites.").
189. Id. See also id. at 15-16 ("Another national survey found that most whites did
not think that whites as a group had benefited from past or present discrimination against
black Americans.").
190. Alan Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Decisions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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focuses on the injury or loss suffered by the victims of racial discrimina-
tion. The perpetrator perspective, however, "means looking at contested
race issues from the vantage point of whites," and the "perpetrator per-
spective in law, like the conservatives' understanding of racism, is
preoccupied with White guilt or innocence." 9 ' The perpetrator perspec-
tive reinforces the notion that racism is primarily a function of individual
actors, who can be found and punished, rather than reflecting on the in-
stitutional and systemic racial norms of society.
The normative quality of this perpetrator perspective was clearly
evidenced in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson when Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that there was not" 'a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary,'" because the "the city points to no evi-
dence that qualified minority contractors have been passed over for city
contracts or subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case.
1 92
On this basisJustice O'Connor concluded that
[p]roper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the
scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to
cure its effects. Such findings also serve to assure all citizens
that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all ra-
cial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken
in the service of the goal of equality itself.
193
Thus, O'Connor reinforces the ideology of the perpetrator perspec-
tive by insisting that the "norm" is "equal treatment of all racial groups"
absent a "finding" of a specific Non-White contractor that has been dis-
criminated against by the old boys network of White contractors. Under
O'Connor's logic, in the absence of finding a bad actor or guilty perpetra-
tor who had discriminated against a non-White contractor, she assumed
that the "normal" operation of the system of state contracting was one
that respected the "equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups.'
'194
c. The Continuing Centrality of Racism
When viewed from a Non-White-centered perspective, racism is
neither a thing of the past nor the product of isolated and individual
191. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 37 (noting that this view "largely ignores whether
people of color have suffered injury or loss of opportunity because of race.").
192. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1988) (quoting Wy-
gant v.Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,277 (1986)).
193. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510. See also id. (noting that "Absent such findings, there is a
danger that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotyping or a
form of racial politics."); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (citing Croson on the "norm of equal
treatment.").
194. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.
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rogue bigots or guilty perpetrators. However, from a Non-White-
centered perspective, the central problem of racism in America today is
not a function of "intentional individual prejudice"'9' by individually rac-
ist White people. Instead, "[R]acism was better understood .... as a sense
of group position [by Whites] and as the organized accumulation of racial
advantage" in a system that "culturally and economically produce[s] sys-
tems of advantage and exclusion that generate privilege for" Whites as a
group at the expense of Non-Whites.'
96
From the Non-White centered perspective, racism does not repre-
sent an extraordinary malfunction of American culture, but rather reflects
one of the fundamental features that are woven into the very structures
and institutions of society itself.197 From this perspective, this sort of insti-
tutional racism is not an exceptional occurrence that exists only on the
fringes of mainstream American society, but rather lies at the very heart of
the system. From this vantage point, racism is seen as a function of sys-
temic forces within societal institutions that operate silently, seamlessly,
and incessantly to privilege Whites and burden Non-Whites, without the
need for any intentional behavior by individual racist actors. In short,
from the Non-White-centered perspective, racism in America is not con-
sidered to be an exceptional act of individual, rogue, bad actors, but rather
is a normative and endemic feature of the very structure of the status quo,
that privileges Whites as a group institutionally, systemically ... and most
importantly, automatically.
From the Non-White-centered perspective, racism is a phenome-
non that can operate either consciously or unconsciously.' 98 In fact, the
unconscious operation of racism constitutes its most ubiquitous and
common manifestation within personal, institutional, and societal contexts
and constitutes a discursive process that operates in the absence of formal
and explicit racial restrictions in order to lower the barriers to access for
Whites and raise them for Non-Whites. Thus, through its reliance on the
White-centered perspective, the ideology of White innocence reflects a
set of "shared narratives and ideologies," through which "federal courts
have mythically transformed systemic racism into an individualism" that
reflects the availability of "choices [that] most people of color do not
have." 99
195. BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 37.
196. Id. at 43.
197. See id. at 34-35 (describing how racism "permeates America's institutions-the
very rules of the game ... [that] loads the dice in favor of European Americans while si-
multaneously restricting African Americans' access to the gaming table.").
198. See generally Lawrence, supra note 95.
199. Dwight L. GreeneJustice Scalia and TontoJudicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth
of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1982 (1992). See id. at
1982 n.7 (noting "[t]his posits a cardinal rule underlying much constitutional jurispru-
dence: that the Constitution protects individuals but not as members of a racial group.").
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From the Non-White-centered perspective, the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Katrina provided compelling evidence of the continuing salience of
race in America, tragically illustrated by the fact that over one hundred
thousand people-mostly Black and poor-were left behind during the
evacuation of New Orleans because their abject poverty deprived them of
any ready means to leave before the city was virtually destroyed by the
greatest natural disaster in American history.200 As viewers watched the
horror unfolding daily on their television screens, tens of thousands of
poor Blacks were left to fend for themselves in the ravaged aftermath of
the storm without food, water, medical help, or security.
2°1
In the nightmare and human tragedy that an inundated and devas-
tated New Orleans had become after this incredible disaster, we will never
know how many poor Blacks died or suffered serious injury waiting for
government rescue that either never came or, sadly, came too late.20 2 In
short, while it may not have been clear to many before the flood, it cer-
tainly was clear afterward that, in many ways, "blacks live in a different
world from whites."
20 3
As starkly summarized by Professor Addis, "[P]ut simply, while most
whites see racism as an occasional unfortunate interruption to the institu-
tional and individual commitments to the values of equal opportunity and
equal treatment, most blacks see racism as a daily routine by which the
lives of black people are systematically and institutionally devalued.,
20 4
200. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 44.
201. See id. ("Day after day of images showed exhausted families and their crying
children stepping around corpses while they begged: Where is the water? .... [T]he
buses?").
202. See id. It is indeed hard to imagine that if over 100,000 White middle or upper
class people were trapped in a major American city after a devastating natural disaster, that
the government would have made them wait for five to six days without food, water or
rescue. Instead, the enormity of the suffering coalesced around the intersection of both
class and race.
203. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & MONICA HERK, "YES BUT.: PRINCIPLES AND CA-
VEATS IN AMERICAN RACIAL ATTITUDES, MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 319 (John Chapman
and Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990). See also Addis, supra note 177, at 2255 n.7 ("[T]he differ-
ent worlds blacks and whites occupy are not only metaphorical. They are physical as
well."); John Lewis, Opinion:This is a National Disgrace: A Civil Rights Leader Mourns an
African American Population Left Behind, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 52:
Maybe we will never know the number of people who have been lost ....
It's so glaring that the great majority of people crying out for help are poor,
they're black. There's a whole segment of society that's being left behind.
When you tell people to evacuate, these people didn't have any way to leave.
They didn't have any cars, any SUVs .... This reminded me of Somalia. But
this is America .... This is an embarrassment. It's a shame. It's a national dis-
grace.
204. See Addis, supra note 177, at 2255.Addis defines devaluation:
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4. Innocent of Benefiting from or Perpetuating Racism
Most Whites do not think that they have received any benefit either
directly or indirectly from the history or the legacy of White supremacy
and racial discrimination against Non-Whites. Instead, based on the
White-centered perspective, they view the current disproportionate social,
economic, and political benefits enjoyed by Whites as the unracialized and
normal results of their individual merit and hard work. In this way,
Whiteness is regarded as being innocent of either benefiting from or per-
petuating historic racism or its contemporary legacy.' °
a. J4/tite Privilege
From a Non-White centered perspective, the perpetuation and benefit
factor of the ideology2 6 of Whiteness expresses a form of innocence that
is characterized as "white privilege.' '20 7 In a widely cited description,
Peggy McIntosh has defined what she describes as the phenomenon of
White privilege "as an invisible package of unearned assets which I can
count on cashing in each day, but about which I was 'meant' to remain
oblivious.' 200 McIntosh then identifies 46 different "daily effects of white
privilege ... which I did not earn but which I have been made to feel are
mine by birth, by citizenship, and by virtue of being a conscientious law-
abiding 'normal' person of good will .... [that] my Afro-American co-
workers, friends, and acquaintances ... cannot count on .... ,,209 McIntosh
describes these unearned assets as being "denied and protected" functions
of her "unearned skin privilege [because] .... whites are taught to think
to refer to the situation when the lives and well-being of"African Americans
are systematically and institutionally given less weight than those of Euro-
pean Americans, and are consequently deemed dispensable either when they
are in some way perceived to be inconsistent with, or to not advance, the in-
terests and well-being of European Americans ....
Id. at 2255 n.8.
205. See RQONALD J. Fiscus, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
MAKING THE CASE FOR QUOTAS 12-13 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1992). See also Antonin
Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147 (1979); George SherJustifying Reverse
Discrimination in Employment, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 159, 160-62 (1975).
206. See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 68, at 63 (noting that "[i]deologies are about
meanings that express 'relations of domination.' ") (quoting JOHN B.THOMPSON, STUDIES IN
THEORY AND IDEOLOGY 4 (Polity Press 1984)).
207. See Wildman, supra note 57, at 247; STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); BERGER, supra note
42; Flagg, supra note 70; FRANKENBERG, supra note 18; LiPSITZ, supra note 18; Sylvia A. Law,
White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603 (1999).
208. McIntosh, supra note 148, at 291.
209. Id. at 293.
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of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, and also ideal
,,210
Until recently, the unearned advantages and privileges that came
with Whiteness were invisible through this White perspective and
experienced by Whites as "the way things are.' '21' As a consequence, from
the White-centered perspective, Whites were unable to "see how this so-
ciety produces advantages for them because these benefits seem so natural
that they are taken for granted, experienced as wholly legitimate."
2 12
Thus, quite literally, Whites were unable to see "how race permeates
America's institutions-the very rules of the game-and its distribution
of opportunities and wealth., 213 In this way, White's have been able to
"convince themselves that life as they experience it on their side of the
color line is simply the objective truth about race., 214 This is why White-
ness is not accurately characterized as a thing but, rather, as a social
location shared by all those who identify as being racially White; therefore,
their failure to "understand that they take [their] racial location for
granted leads racial realists to ignore the ways in which race loads the dice
in favor of European Americans while simultaneously restricting African




White privilege is expensive. The real and material benefits gener-
ated by White privilege impose equal and opposite costs on Non-
Whites.216 As George Lipsitz has argued, whether its recipients are willing
to acknowledge it or not, the benefits derived from White privilege have
actual cash values that Whites actively enjoy, protect, and invest in as an
economic asset. Lipsitz argues that Whiteness is a powerful "social fact"
that has "cash value .... [and was] created and continued with all-too-real
consequences for the distribution of wealth, prestige, and opportunity.
'217
He also observes that "white Americans are encouraged to invest in ...
[and] to remain true to an identity that provides them with resources
[and] power ....,,218
210. Id. at 291-93.
211. Wildman, supra note 57, at 255 (quoting Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1661-62).
212. BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 34.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 35.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 44.
217. LlPSITZ, supra note 18, at vii.
218. Id. Lipsitz elaborates that Whiteness
accounts for advantages that come to individuals through profits made from
housing secured in discriminatory markets, through the unequal educations
[VOL. 11:477
S The Color of Perspective
Lipsitz goes on to argue that, despite the fact that contemporary
Whites deny perpetuating racism and benefiting from it and continually
"disavow that whiteness means anything at all to [them]," in fact, the evi-
dence shows that they spend so much "time and energy on the creation
and re-creation of whiteness ... that nearly every social choice that white
people make about where they live, what schools their children attend,
what careers they pursue, and what policies they endorse is shaped by
considerations involving race."
219
Lipsitz concludes that contemporary racism is characterized not by
individual acts of racial animus and old-fashioned bigotry, but rather by
systemic and institutional processes that contribute to asset accumulation
for whites and asset disaccumulation for Blacks. In this way, Lipsitz cor-
rectly observes that "Whiteness is invested in, like property, but it is also a
means of accumulating property and keeping it from others.
'220
This process of categorically accumulating assets within one racial
group while systematically denying them to another racial group has been
characterized as "[o]pportunity hoarding,"221 which has been described
not as individual racial animus by consciously bigoted Whites, but as a
"group phenomenon ... by one group to the detriment of another.' 222
From this group perspective, it is clear that "the experiences of white and
nonwhite Americans are intimately connected. The benefits of being
white are related to the costs of being nonwhite, 223 There is a direct link
between the advantages that Whites enjoy from an institutionally and
racially stratified society and the burdens and limits they impose on Non-
Whites.224
The institutional White benefits and Non-White burdens run across
virtually every aspect of American society. Under these conditions of
widespread institutional White advantage at the cost of Non-White-and
specifically Black disadvantage-it is little wonder that so many Whites
allocated to children of different races, through insider networks that channel
employment opportunities to the relatives and friends of those who have
profited most from present and past racial discrimination, and especially
through intergenerational transfers of inherited wealth that pass on the spoils
of discrimination to succeeding generations.
id.
219. Id. at viii.
220. Id.
221. BROWN FT AL., supra note 6, at 191.
222. Id. ("Whites are advantaged in labor markets when they are able to rig the rules
of the game and control access to jobs and promotions by defining required credentials,
limiting access to training or education, or otherwise closing off access to blacks or other
groups.").
223. Id. at 51.
224. See id. ("As individuals and as a group, [whites] derive advantages from the ways
in which race limits the lives of people of color, whether they know it or not.").
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are resentful at "having to compete without the hidden benefits of being
white. 22' For them, this experience must certainly feel like a "significant
hardship" unjustly upsetting their settled expectation of universal White
advantage. 226
David Wellman summarizes this point by noting that "[n]ow white
men actually have to compete against women and people of color. And
sometimes that means they really do come in second, or even third.
227
c. Personal Benefit
Analyzing the White-centered perspective on racial reality can be
instructive and illuminating because "[u]nderstanding a person's racial
worldview from the perspective of racial identity theory also reveals how
a person participates in and understands individual, institutional, and cul-
tural racism., 228 In America, "Every white person ... is socialized with
implicit and explicit racial messages about him- or herself and members
of visible racial/ethnic groups ... [and] [a]ccepting these messages results
in racism becoming an integral component of each white person's ego or
personality.' 2 9 As a consequence, "[E]volving a nonracist white identity
begins with individuals accepting their 'whiteness' and recognizing the
225. BROWN Fr AL., supra note 6, at 51. See also id. (citing Jennifer Hochschild, Race,
Class, Power and the American Wefare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE (Amy
Gutman ed., 1988)) (noting that "As the number of contestants for a fixed number of
prizes increases, the chances of winning decrease. The arithmetic is simple: As blacks gain
chances, whites lose certainty.").
226. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 51. See also id. at 52 (noting that "today's race
hierarchy is a powerful force. Thus whites, aware or not, misguided or not, typically resist
change because their privileged status comes with (unearned) advantages. White Ameri-
cans who believe they will lose if blacks gain are prone to oppose policies designed to
reduce racial inequalities.").
227. David Wellman, Minstrel Shows, Affirmative Action Talk, and Angry White Men:
Marking Racial Otherness in the 1990's, in FRANKENBERG, supra note 136, at 322.
228. James M.Jones & Robert Carter, Racism and White Racial Identity Merging Reali-
ties, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 4 (Benjamin P Bowser & Raymond G.
Hunt eds., 1996). See also id. ("Having a knowledge of racial identity can serve to deepen
our understanding of the mechanism used to maintain racism in all its forms.").
229. Id. at 4-5.Jones and Carter ask:
Is every White person in the United States racist? Not necessarily. Is every
White person exposed to social, institutional, and cultural message[s] that
promote racism?Yes.What matters.. .is how he or she interprets the messages
received about racial groups... [in order to avoid] .... the color-blind status,
where the existence of race and racism are denied but the person's behavior
and attitudes are guided by racist principles that have never been questioned.
Id. at 4-5.
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ways in which they participate in and benefit from individual, institu-
tional, and cultural racism.' 2 a°
From a Non-White-centered perspective, the argument that con-
temporary Whites derive no benefit from their Whiteness is hopelessly
naive because of the substantial "cash value ' 231 that is associated with
Whiteness. Moreover, "As long as we define social life as the sum total of
conscious and deliberative individual activities, we will be able to discern
as racist only individual manifestations of personal prejudice and hostil-
ity.
'232
II. AFFiRMATivE ACTION AND WHITE INNOCENCE
As Randall Kennedy reminds us, "The controversy over affirmative
action constitutes the most salient current battlefront in the ongoing con-
flict over the status of blacks in American life, 2 33 although the phrase does
not easily admit to either a precise or "all-encompassing definition." 234 Its
meanings run the gamut from programs focused simply on "the goal of
,,235 236outreach3 3 z to a remedy of present or past discrimination, to programs
that are focused principally on the goal of achieving a degree of diversity
that would be otherwise unobtainable. 237 However, regardless of which
definition of affirmative action is embraced, they all have one important
characteristic in common-an explicit consciousness of race and some
degree of preference based on perceived racial identity.
2 3
230. Id. at 4.
231. LIPSITZ, supra note 18, at vii. See also id. at viii.
232. Id. at 20.
233. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: The Affirmative Action Debate, in DEBAT-
ING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 48
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
234. John David Skrentny, Introduction to COLORLINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRA-
TION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 4 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001).
235. CARL COHEN & JAMES P. STERBA, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCE:
A DEBATE 202 (2003) (explaining this purpose as consisting of "searching out qualified
women and minority candidates who would otherwise not know about or apply for the
available positions, and then hiring or accepting only those who are actually the most
qualified.").
236. Id. (describing remedial programs of two kinds, the first designed to "put an end
to an existing discriminatory practice, and to create, possibly for the first time in a particu-
lar setting, a truly equal opportunity environment." And the second, designed to "attempt
to compensate for past discrimination and the effects of that discrimination.").
237. Id. at 203 (describing programs designed to pursue "the goal of diversity, where
the pursuit of diversity is, in turn, justified either in terms of its educational benefits or in
terms of its ability to create a more effective workforce .... ).
238. See id. at 15 (describing the transformation of affirmative action from an origi-
nal paradigm of color-blindness to one in which preference is given on the basis of race.).
See also JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 6 (1996) (noting the term affirmative action actually "predates
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To the extent that affirmative action is generally defined as public
and private preferences based on race, most accounts of the history and
development of these racialized policies date their origins back only thirty
years or so to the Kennedy administration and Executive Order 10925 in
the Civil Rights era of the 1960s23 9 and the Nixon administration in
1969240 with the principal recipients being American Blacks. 241 However,
that version of the story reflects a distinctly White-centered perspective of
the history of government and private sector race-based preferences.
From a Non-White perspective, affirmative action has a much
longer historical time line, almost the entire length of which was focused
on private and public programs that channeled economic, educational,
and employment preferences exclusively to Whites on the basis of race.242
In fact, the first official use of the phrase "affirmative action" was in 1935
in the context of the National Labor Relations Act and was designed to
the civil rights movement, stemming from the centuries-old English legal concept of eq-
uity, or the administration ofjustice according to what was fair in a particular situation, as
opposed to rigidly following legal rules, which may have a harsh result."); id. at 7 (describ-
ing how affirmative action evolved from a "color-blind approach .... to mean 'race
conscious,' rather than color-blind.").
239. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 26 (describing the Kennedy administration's
issuance of Executive Order 10925 in the summer of 1963 formally initiating affirmative
action programs in an effort to "open doors that had been sealed shut for more than three
centuries."). See also Skrentny, supra note 234, at 4; Nicolaus Mills, Introduction: To Look Like
America, in MILLS, supra note 233, at 5; id. (noting that President Franklin Roosevelt had
also instituted a form of affirmative action in favor of hiring Blacks in the 1940s in a
"tepid Executive Order 8802 of 1941, banning discrimination in war industries and the
armed services."); id. (noting that President Dwight Eisenhower also had initiated a similar
and equally tepid form of affirmative action in his "executive orders on federal contract
compliance."); id. at 7 (noting that President Lyndon Johnson also implemented affirma-
tive action policies in favor of Blacks in "Executive Orders 11246 in 1965 and 11375 in
1967 ... but the key Johnson declaration on affirmative action came in a speech 'To Fulfill
These Rights,' delivered at the Howard University commencement in June 1965 ....
[insisting on] 'equality as a result' and 'not just legal equity.' "); COHEN & STERBA, supra note
235, at 12 (noting that it was the order by President Kennedy "that initiated our national
commitment to 'affirmative action'-our determination to take positive steps to extirpate
all preference by race.").
240. See Thomas J. Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative Action in
the Workplace, in SKRENTNY, supra note 234, at 31 (describing how the "Kennedy, Johnson,
and Nixon administrations all identified the construction industry as the primary target
for the evolving policy of affirmative action. Those efforts culminated in 1969 with the
Nixon administration's Philadelphia Plan... that became a model for nationwide affirma-
tive action mandates.").
241. Other groups such as White women and a number of other racially identifiable
subgroups were eventually added to the list of those eligible to receive benefits under
affirmative action polices. See id. at 32.
242. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HIs-
TORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2005).
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protect White union workers who were being harassed or retaliated
against because of their union activities.
24 3
Affirmative action is particularly relevant ground from which to
gain insight into the nature and significance of differences in racial per-
spectives because affirmative action has been, and promises to continue to
be, an especially polarizing, contentious, and socially-combustible topic
with opposing camps composed largely, although not exclusively, along
racial lines.24 At the core of the disagreement between these opposing
factions is a fundamental miscommunication. 24 This miscommunication is
a result of the differences in the racially-distinct starting points that
ground and orient each camp's respective racial perspectives. Thus, the
argument is not so much over the substantive fairness or effectiveness of
affirmative action programs per se as it is over the appropriate perspective
from which to view them.
Those who oppose affirmative action generally see the issue from a
White-centered perspective that, among other things, presumes the social,
political, economic, and educational status quo is racially neutral and that
the social and political debt for slavery was exhausted with the formal
dismantling of Jim Crow and the enactment of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. This view is also premised on the assumption that contemporary
Whites bear no personal responsibility for existing racial inequality be-
cause they had no personal role in the creation of past racism and do not
participate in perpetuating or benefiting from its legacy in the form of
present-day racial subordination and discrimination.
However, those who support affirmative action as a broad policy
matter and see the issue from a Non-White-centered perspective have
reached very different conclusions. A Non-White-centered perspective on
this issue presumes that the social, political, economic, and educational
status quo is not neutral, but is in fact heavily skewed in favor of Whites.
This view is premised on the presumption that America's social and po-
litical debt for its historic racial sins of slaveryJim Crow and the legacy of
243. Skrentny observes that the
phrase affirmative action first appeared as part of the 1935 National Labor Re-
lations Act. Here it meant that an employer who was found to be
discriminating against union members or union organizers would have to
stop discriminating, and also take affirmative action to place those victims
where they would have been without the discrimination.
See SKRENTNY, supra note 238, at 6. See also James E.Jones,Jr., The Rise and Fall of Affirma-
tive Action, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Herbert Hill & James E.
Jones,Jr. eds., 1993).
244. See Sugrue, supra note 240, at 48 ("Affirmative action remains one of the most
fiercely contested legacies of the civil rights era . ... In a short period of time ... affirma-
tive action moved from obscurity to prominence .... ).
245. See Lawrence Bobo, Race Interests, and Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Unanswered
Questions and New Directions, in SKRENTNY, supra note 234, at 208-209.
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legalized discrimination has not been exhausted by the removal of express
and formal barriers of racial discrimination.
Instead, this perspective posits that informal, systemic, institutional,
psychological, and unconscious racism continue to shape and benefit the
lives of every White person and to burden the lives of every Non-White
person, solely on the basis of race.246 While viewing racial reality from this
Non-White perspective does not automatically equate with supporting
affirmative action as a policy matter, it does significantly shift the terms of
the debate and undercuts one of the principal ideological pillars upon
which opposition to affirmative action policies currently depends.
Further, the Non-White-centered perspective also holds that con-
temporary Whites do in fact bear a considerable personal responsibility
for the continuing legacy of racial inequality because, although they are
not responsible for the creation of the historical causes of racism, they
benefit from the legacy of racism every day in a myriad of ways. As a con-
sequence, they are deeply implicated and invested in maintaining the
racial status quo of deep and continuing racial inequality. From this per-
spective, whether consciously or unconsciously, most Whites engage in
personal acts daily to actively reinforce, perpetuate and reinscribe racial
distinctions and promote racial discrimination. Thus, from the Non-
White-centered perspective, the idea that most contemporary Whites are
innocent of active personal participation in promoting, reinscribing, and
benefiting from racism is not only na'ive but also historically (and pro-
foundly) wrong.
Affirmative action in education and employment has been combus-
tible social tender and the source of continuing, deep, and significant
White resentment since it was first introduced 247 In fact, it has been sug
gested that the depth of White resentment is so profound that "'a number
of whites dislike the idea of affirmative action so much and perceive it to
be so unfair that they have come to dislike blacks as a conse-
, ,,248
quence ....
Thus, it is important to keep in mind that "the ideological meanings
of a contested racial policy like affirmative action are determined within a
246. See LIPsITZ, supra note 18, at 20.
247. See Kennedy, supra note 233.
248. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 312 (quoting PAUL M. SNIDER-
MAN& THOMAS PIAZzA, THE SCAR OF RACE 8 (1993)). It is striking, and perhaps illustrative
of the difference in racial vantage points, that these otherwise reasonable scholars can actu-
ally believe that Whites who were not racists before affirmative action have been driven
into the arms of racism, and began to "dislike Blacks" solely as a consequence of the exis-
tence of these programs. Of course, they offer neither rational argument nor empirical
evidence to support this dramatic rhetoric. Moreover, from a Non-White vantage point, a
compelling argument can be made that any Whites who claim to have been so malig-
nantly converted in their racial views solely on the basis of affirmative action are woefully
deficient in credibility and are probably engaged in a murky effort to justify preexisting
racial antipathy towards Blacks.
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social-cognitive matrix that is raced. A similar policy with a different set
of beneficiaries might not have the same ideological resonance. ' 24 9 These
ideological meanings are distinctly racial and are reinforced and rein-
scribed by the language and images that are employed by the Supreme
Court in articulating the bases of their decisions in racially-inflected
claims of constitutional violations.5 Behind these ideological underpin-
nings are the Court's "unstated assumptions about the nature of
difference, 25 ' which reveal not a racially-neutral jurisprudence but one
which is constitutionally, impermissibly concerned with the welfare of
one particular racial group-Whites. Notably, this concern is not based
on Whites as individuals but as a racial group.2 52
As George Lipsitz has observed, in resenting and resisting affirmative
action, many Whites argue that they are "innocent victims of remedies for
a disease that did not even exist. ' 25 3 The ideology of White innocence lies
at the very heart of this White resentment. Disrupting the ideology may
well be the illusive Holy Grail to dismantle such ubiquitous White re-
sentment. The late scholar Ron Fiscus articulated this idea in the early
1990s when he observed that
the innocent persons argument is more than an important
constitutional argument. It is a widely held, racially polarizing
249. Lousw, supra note 103, at 72-73. See also id. at 73 ("More generally, if when
assessing a policy observers make use of a causal specification that has been 'colored' by
racial stigma, then they may perceive that policy as being especially threatening to their
ideological positions.").
250. Minow notes that this dynamic gives rise to
powerful unstated assumptions about whose point of view matters, and about
what is given and what is mutable in the world. 'Difference' is only meaning-
fil as a comparison .... Legal treatment of difference tends to take for
granted an assumed point of comparison ... [s]uch comparisons work in part
through the very structures of our language, which embeds the unstated
points of comparison inside categories that bury their perspective and
wrongly imply a natural fit with the world.
See Minow, supra note 1, at 13.
251. Minow, supra note 1,at 31.
252. Thomas Sugrue, for example, writes:
At the heart of the battle over affirmative action was a debate about the very
meaning of liberalism itself. .... The deep-rooted white opposition to af-
firmative action was at bottom a defense of a racial status quo that
marginalized blacks in urban labor markets-a situation solidified by New
Deal labor and economic policies that disproportionately benefited white
workers. Affirmative action's critics masked their own unacknowledged iden-
tity politics in seemingly neutral, universalist rhetoric that they themselves
had rejected only a few years earlier.
Sugrue, supra note 240, at 49.
253. LiPSITZ, supra note 18, at 35.
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social argument. The near-universal belief in it is without
doubt the single most powerful source of popular resentment
of affirmative action. If the belief could somehow be undercut,
the resentment toward affirmative action and the associated ra-• - - 254
cial polarization might be diminished.
Because of its power to engender such profound White resentment, the
rhetoric of White innocence in the hands of the Supreme Court is not
simply used to resolve affirmative action claims; instead, it amounts to a
weapon of White supremacy that is deployed to justify, legitimize, and
maintain the existing racial status quo. Under such circumstances, it is
hardly surprising that America's debate over affirmative action consists
255
largely of such stridently opposing camps.
254. Fiscus, supra note 205, at 7-8. See also id. at 7 ("Until the premise of innocence
is effectively refuted, no degree of burdening [of whites by affirmative action] will be prin-
cipled .... [and] no defense of affirmative action is going to be wholly persuasive.");
Interestingly, although a supporter of affirmative action as a wise and important
public and private policy, Professor Fiscus unconsciously associates the "near universal"
belief in White innocence, primarily among Whites, as being representative of all Ameri-
cans. Similarly, in suggesting that affirmative action will not be persuasive without
reconciling the innocence argument, the question that immediately presents itself is, per-
suasive to whom-Whites? This phraseology ignores all the Non-Whites (and Whites) to
whom affirmative action is already persuasive despite impassioned claims of White inno-
cence. This typifies the association of Whiteness with humanity or at least with all (real)
Americans generally. In this inadvertent phrasing he has effectively erased all Non-White
(as well as White) Americans who do not "believe" in the "self evident truth" of White
innocence.
In addition, the exclusive focus on White resentment ignores the fact that there is
Non-White resentment as well. In fact, much of the Non-White resentment that is ig-
nored by the White gaze is based not simply on the presence and dominance of White
supremacy, but also on the fact that so many Whites perceive themselves as racially inno-
cent. Non-White, but especially Black, resentment is rarely ever discussed unless it is
characterized as "Black rage," "Black outrage" or "Black anger," but never dignified simply
as resentment. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 496-97 (discussing the
public titillation with "racially hostile black anger" and Black "rage" as an organizing prin-
ciple in work of Black writers.). In contrast, bell hooks describes her own sense of
racialized rage as "a constructive healing rage" that leads to a sense of"self-recovery" that is
"ultimately about learning to see clearly." hooks, supra note 16, at 18.
In short, when Whites react negatively to race, they are being resentful; but when
Blacks do the same, they are exhibiting rage. This rhetoric perpetuates the essentialism of
Whiteness and the marginality of Non-Whiteness, and paints Whiteness as synonymous
with reasonableness and Non-Whiteness with irrationality and bestiality.
255. See Bobo, supra note 245, at 191 (noting that "[t]he debate over affirmative ac-
tion often seems to involve two warring camps, each of which stakes a mutually exclusive
claim to moral virtue .... Opponents see their antagonists as advancing a morally bank-
rupt claim to victim status and the spoils of racial privilege .... ).
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A. Whiteness as Coterminous with Innocence
Although the Court frequently invokes the rhetoric of innocence
and equates it presumptively with Whiteness, it neither provides nor even
attempts to provide a definition for the term.256 This is especially problem-
atic because without some degree of precision in a working definition of
White innocence, the Court's invocation of this rhetoric has no substan-
tive content that can be reasonably applied, rejected, or even rationally
257
evaluated by the lower courts.
In the absence of any effort to define the term White innocence, we
are left only to conclude the Court does not consider that it requires an
independent definition. This approach suggests the Court is taking judicial
notice of the innocence of Whites. However, under the Federal Rules of• 258
Evidence, judicial notice in this context is wholly inappropriate. The
Federal Rules of Evidence clearly state that judicial notice is limited to
those facts "not subject to reasonable dispute in that [they are] either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
[are] capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.' '2"' As a general matter,
both at the trial and appellate level, "judicial notice is limited to facts evi-
denced by public records and facts of general notoriety.!
26
0
The observation that Whites generally are racially innocent is clearly
not a matter "whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned., 261 This
256. The ideology of innocence does not appear to have a particularly significant
influence on the Court in the absence of race. In stark contrast to its receptivity to the
concerns ofWhite innocence, the Court appears to be surprisingly resistant and unsympa-
thetic to claims of both "actual innocence," as well as "constitutional innocence."
Therefore, it appears that the power of innocence over the courts is not based on inno-
cence alone but rather on the particular power of the ideology ofWhite innocence.
257. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 368 (3d ed. 2000)
(arguing that "the ultimate issue is whether it is possible and appropriate to translate the
principles underlying the constitutional provision at issue into restrictions on government,
or affirmative definitions of individual liberty, which [lower] courts can articulate and
apply.").
258. See FED. R. EViD. 201(b).
259. 31A C.J.S § 9 (1996). See also UNi. R. EVID. 201(b); Castillo-Villagra v. IN.S,
972 E2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992); Citizens for a Better Environment v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 649 F2d 522, 526 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that judicial notice is
limited to facts which are not subject to reasonable dispute).
260. 31A C.J.S. § 9 (1996). See also id.
Most matters which the court may notice fall into one of two classes, those
which come to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordi-
nary experience of life, and are therefore in the mind of the trier, or those
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
demonstration by means commonly recognized as authoritative.
261. Id.
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entire article constitutes but one in a long line of articles going back to
1986 that have questioned the coherency of this concept.162 Nor is it a
concept that is "generally accepted by mankind as true" unless mankind is
synonymous with Whites and excludes all Non-Whites. As the analysis in
this Article has demonstrated, from the Non-White perspective, Whites
are not considered to be racially innocent at all; rather, they are considered
to be guilty in that they are involved with benefiting from and perpetuat-
ing racial discrimination in profound and continuing ways both as
individuals and as a group, both consciously and unconsciously.
Although it is not always precisely clear what the Court means when
it invokes the rhetoric of innocence, it is clear to whom the Court is refer-
ring-Whites. Thus, through the rhetoric of White innocence, and the
erroneous application of judicial notice, the Court appears to have con-
structed a mythologized and racialized concept of constitutionally
cognizable innocence that does not just include Whites, but is, in fact, co-
263terminous with whiteness.
The Court's construction of whiteness with innocence is especially
illustrated in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.26
Applying the strict scrutiny test, she explained that the essence of the
"narrowly tailored" requirement is its capacity to ensure that race-
conscious remedies are constitutionally sustainable only to the extent that
they "work the least harm possible to ... innocent persons competing for
the same benefit.' '261 She goes on to state: "[t]o be narrowly tailored, a
race-conscious admissions program must not 'unduly burden individuals
who are not members of the favored racial ... groups: ,,266
According to Justice O'Connor, the proper constitutional measure
of narrow tailoring is the extent to which race-conscious remedies avoid
harming a group she described as "innocent persons."This group of inno-
262. See generally; John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial
Privilege, 34 U.S.E L. REV. 419 (1999); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Ac-
tion, and Innocent Victims:Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
791 (1991); Devins, supra note 3; Ross (both sources listed), supra note 49; Sullivan, supra
note 49.
263. Although in Grutter O'Connor also says that "Narrow tailoring, therefore, re-
quires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group," the overall tenor of her references to the concept of innocence strongly suggests
that she, along with the rest of the current Court, does in fact equate innocence with
Whiteness. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
264. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
265. Id. at 341.
266. Id. (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., dissenting)). See id. at 333 (quoting Richmond v.J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S.
469,493 (1989) (plurality opinion)) ("[t]he purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is
to ensure that the means chosen fit the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereo-
type.").
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cent persons consists of those who are not included in the so-called "fa-
vored racial group."Thus,Justice O'Connor characterizes the beneficiaries
of race-conscious programs as members of a "favored racial group" and,
by implication, those who do not necessarily benefit are characterized as
members of a non-favored racial group. Since the members of the "fa-
vored racial groups" in race-conscious programs are clearly Non-White
persons, O'Connor's logic suggests that the category of "innocent per-
sons" she has in mind who must be protected from harm by the strict
scrutiny "narrow tailoring" requirement consists exclusively of an undif-
ferentiated group of bedfellows who are all White, without regard to their
personal histories, views, values or experiences.
Justice O'Connor also suggests that the primary unifying character-
istics of the members of the non-favored racial group are their Whiteness,
innocence, and victimization from race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams. Any doubt in this regard is resolved by her conclusion in Grutter, in
which she noted that the Law School affirmative action program had
passed constitutional muster because "in the context of its individualized
inquiry ... the admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants.,
267
Since O'Connor does not define the term innocence, she does not
attempt to establish the innocence of this all-White group she imagines;
instead, she simply assumes and asserts their innocent status as a fact with-
out a scintilla of evidence or argument. Thus, from the Court's
perspective, the racial innocence of all Whites as a group is not a result of
logical argument with which one could take issue because it appears to be
a matter ofjudicial notice beyond debate.
It is indeed problematic that the Court simply presumes the exis-
tence of racial innocence, racially equates innocence with Whiteness, and
neither engages in analysis nor insists that this position be subject to ele-
ments of proof or critical inquiry of any sort. It is especially problematic
because, to the extent that innocence becomes constitutionally cotermi-
nous with Whiteness, how is Non-)Whiteness to be regarded-as not
innocent or guilty? What are the implications of a constitutional pre-
sumption of White innocence over Non-White guilt?
This grouping of innocent Whites is obviously quite over-inclusive
because by definition it must commingle such interesting bedfellows as
committed White anti-racists on one extreme and rabid and equally
committed White supremacists on the other, making Whites as a group
not wholly innocent simply by virtue of their Whiteness. 268 As such, to the
267. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
268. Although by logical inference O'Connor assumed that the plaintiff Barbara
Grutter was an "innocent White," suppose instead that it was known that the plaintiff was
an avowed White supremacist who hated anyone who was not White, actively practiced
racial discrimination and advocated violent racial holy war? Under O'Connor's view of
White innocence, even this person would be considered racially innocent. Thus, in
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extent that the concept of innocence is thought to be coterminous with
Whiteness, it is clearly over-inclusive because it would include many who
are clearly not innocent, such as the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.
Therefore, the Court's deployment of the notion of innocence is inher-
ently too imprecise and over-inclusive a concept to be worthy of serious
constitutional consideration.
B. Affirmative Action and the Ideology of White Innocence
Each of the four elements of the ideology of White innocence iden-
tified in Section I have been deployed by the Court, to one extent or
another, in resolving racially-inflected claims of constitutional protection.
However, when the Court invokes the rhetoric of White innocence, it
appears to focus on the third and fourth elements of the ideology involv-
ing innocence from racism and racial benefit. Frequently, the Court's
invocation of White innocence is deeply embedded in the strict scrutiny
analysis: 269 in order to pass constitutional muster, explicitly race-conscious
government programs must satisfy a bifurcated test that requires the pro-
gram to serve a compelling state interest 270 and also be sufficiently
narrowly-tailored27 1 to achieve that interest.
1. Innocent of Race
Recall that the earlier discussion of the "innocent of race" element
emphasized that although from a White-centered-perspective Whiteness is
O'Connor's view, racial guilt has been defined out of existence because all Whites are by
definition racially innocent without regard to their individual views, values, politics, or
even their actions. Thus, one could argue that her category of innocent Whites is not only
overbroad, but also fatally incoherent because it assumes racial innocence solely on the
basis of skin color regardless of the individual facets of assorted White personalities who
would strongly contest that description. In fact, she comes dangerously close to suggesting
that all Whites as a racial group are presumptively and inherently racially innocent solely
on the basis of their Whiteness.
269. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (holding that strict scrutiny must be applied to all gov-
ernment uses of racial classifications, whether invidious, remedial, or benign).
270. Id. at 493.
271. Id. The standard of narrow tailoring does not require that such programs be the
most narrowly tailored alternative possible. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (finding "[n]arrow
tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative .... [it]
does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alterna-
tives."). See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (noting that any race-conscious remedial program
must " ' fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."); Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (noting that the standard of narrow tailoring
"require[s] only a good faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by the goal
itself.").
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not a race, simultaneouslyWhites are acutely aware of their own racialized
Whiteness and the Non-Whiteness of racial others. Consequently, Whites
consider those differences to be somehow reflective of real and essential
biological differences.
This element of the ideology of Whiteness is illustrated by the
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence and reflected in the Court's dis-
cussion of racial neutrality. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion noted in the context of the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict
scrutiny test that, although "narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion
of every conceivable race-neutral alternative .... [it] does, however, re-
quire serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity that the university seeks., 272 Tak-
ing race into account, or not doing so (characterized as racial neutrality),
is effectively understood to mean that the Court is only considering the
Non-Whiteness of Non-Whites. However, taking race into account
should not be limited to the race of Non-Whites; it should also require a
consideration of the Whiteness of Whites. There have been precious few
calls for the elimination of the Whiteness of Whites being taken into ac-
count by affirmative action's opponents. In effect, their position amounts
to one in which Whites want to ignore Non-Whiteness-especially
Blackness-while simultaneously continuing to take their own Whiteness
into account.
Essentially, Justice O'Connor's asking admissions officers to seriously
and in good faith consider race-neutral alternatives, is tantamount to ask-
ing them to do what no one in America is capable of doing-imagining
an entirely raceless person. What would such a person look like? How
would he or she function in a society that is so keenly aware and depend-
ant on perceived racial identity? How would his or her racelessness affect
his or her treatment, experiences, and opportunities?
Justice O'Connor's proposition constitutes an absurd fantasy in
twenty-first century America, because not only are there no unraced peo-
ple, but there is no model or paradigm to dictate how to imagine one. In
America, one is either White or Non-White; race is always present. Thus,
if racial neutrality amounts to ignoring Non-Whiteness, the only coher-
ent category left is Whiteness. Consequently, any attempted regime of race
neutrality would in effect create a situation where everyone would be
presumed to be White-not unraced-because in a highly-racialized na-
tion like America one is, without exception,White or Non-White.273
272. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
273. See Ross, supra note 18 (exploring the effects on the racial identity ofWhiteness
after September 11, 2001). Professor Ross argues against a scientific racial backdrop in
which Arabs and South Asians are racially categorized as Caucasians, especially with regard
to brown South Asians and Aryan Caucasians, he observes that "this is surely.. .also par-
tially a racial war" and "[i]n this war, .. the archenemy is the brown skinned radical
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From the White-centered perspective, the Court's idea of race neu-
trality is a fantasy which would project presumptive Whiteness on every
applicant. There is nothing racially-neutral about such a program with or
without the express use of racial terms. As a result, those who are in fact
White get their files reviewed from a perspective that matches their own,
amounting to a racial benefit, not a racially-neutral fact. However, those
who are Non-White would be presumed to be White and would not get
their applications read by an equally racially-sympathetic and compatible
perspective. In fact, since Non-White applicant files would usually be re-
viewed from a White-centered perspective, their own racial perspectives
would be neither recognized nor valued, and their lives and accomplish-
ments would be reviewed from a racial perspective different from their
own.
More importantly, admission decisions that purport not to expressly
take race into account, and thereby claim to be racially-neutral, are fun-
damentally hypocritical because they assume that race can be erased as a
relevant factor in the development of a person's life up to the point of
application. These programs assume that an individual's personal racial
history of struggle and success is irrelevant to a rational evaluation of their
future prospects of success and contribution to society, reflecting a dis-
tinctly White-centered perspective on race.
Because most Whites have the luxury of not having to think of
themselves in racial terms, they can easily expect that the same must be
true for everyone else. But for most Non-Whites, and especially Blacks,
racial identity is not something they can afford to ignore, because ordi-
nary social intercourse in America is filled with constant reminders to
Non-Whites that they are not White.7 4
The Court's ideal of racial neutrality is also irrational because, in the
context of university admissions, a candidate's past strengths and future
potential cannot be reasonably evaluated without all of the candidate's
most relevant life experiences. For many Non-White applicants, their ra-
cial identities are relevant pieces of the whole package because, for them,
such an identity forms an important part in determining who they are,
how they got that way, where they want to go, why they want to go there,
and the strength of their motivation to accomplish those goals. To arbi-
Muslim 'terrorist.' This imagery naturally conjures its opposite, the White Christian 'war-
rior." See id. at 239.
It is important to note here that those who consider themselves "racially mixed" are
still essentially characterized as Non-White. Regardless of racial mixtures, in the American
racial lexicon, such individuals are still by definition not "White." Thus, racially-mixed
identity is still a subcategory of being Non-White, whether that mixture includes an
amalgam ofWhite and other, or some combination of various others.
274. See Flagg, supra note 70, at 969 (noting that "[i]n fact, whites appear to pursue
th[e] option [of not thinking of themselves in racial terms] so habitually that it may be a
defining characteristic of whiteness.").
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trarily ban this type of highly relevant and probative information from
active consideration by admission officials is to be willfully blind to the
overall detriment of the applicant's admission prospects and the institu-
tion's commitment to evaluate the whole candidate. Viewing higher
education admissions from this perspective ensures that no one, whether
White or Non-White, is ever admitted to institutions of higher learning
without racial considerations playing some role in the evaluation of their
worthiness. White applicants are admitted against a racialized backdrop in
which their Whiteness is both presumed and privileged 27 as the norma-
tive experience of simply being an American.
Similarly, Non-White applicants, whether they present files with su-
perlative traditional credentials that equal or surpass their White
counterparts or just marginal ones, are erroneously presumed to be either
White or celebrated as a high-achieving Non-White. But given America's
historic and continuing obsession with race, racial considerations are in-
evitably always part of the evaluative process because they are the very
measures of merit against which individuals are assessed.276
This position does not depend on a universal relevance of racial ex-
perience for all Non-Whites, but, rather, a universal allowance for its
existence, recognition, and respect. To the extent that race forms an im-
portant part of the empirical social reality in the lives of applicants (both
White and Non-White), Justice O'Connor's vision of racial neutrality
constitutes an arbitrary, irrational, and counterproductive policy that
strongly advantages Whites and heavily burdens Non-Whites. Accordingly,
so-called racially-neutral policies like those suggested by Justice
O'Connor are not racially-neutral at all but instead reflect what Ira





275. See Wildman, supra note 57, at 245 n.6 (observing that "[t]he term 'privilege'
remains problematic, since privilege can connote a reward for an earned achievement.
White privilege is not earned. Yet academic discourse has widely adopted the phrase
'White privilege,' and, increasingly, more popular circles recognize it as well."). See also
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDER-
MINES AMERICA (1996).
276. See Wildman, supra note 57, at 247 (noting that the "[ciharacteristics of the
privileged group define the societal norm. From 'flesh colored' bandages or crayons and
'nude' hosiery that depict fair skin to standardized testing, individual members of society
are judged against characteristics held by the privileged.").
277. See LIPSITZ, supra note 18, at 22 (noting that "[g]roup interests are not mono-
lithic .... All whites do not benefit from the possessive investment in whiteness in
precisely the same ways; the experiences of members of minority groups are not inter-
changeable. But the possessive investment in whiteness always affects individual and group
life chances and opportunities.").
278. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 160-61 (2005). See discussion,
infra Section II.A.4 regarding "historical amnesia" ofWhite affirmative action.
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The basic premise is that the talents, merits, and abilities of contem-
porary White applicants to higher education are not the products of their
birthright, but instead the result of a multitude of economic and socio-
logical forces that are inextricably tied to the White affirmative action
policies that produced the worlds in which these children were reared to
maturity.27 Contemporary affirmative action polices that expressly require
the recognition of Non-White identity do not introduce race into an
otherwise racially-pristine calculation. Quite the reverse: they merely bal-
ance an already racialized calculation that has expressly granted Whites
enormous racial preference. In sum, evaluations claiming to be racially-
neutral can never actually be so because White applicants are the direct
beneficiaries of prior government affirmative action for Whites.
2. Innocent of Racial Perspective
Through a rhetorical narrative grounded in the White-centered per-
spective, the Supreme Court has deeply embedded into American
constitutional affirmative action discourse a powerful and irresistible asso-
ciation between innocence and Whites as a group. This association
characterizes Whites as innocent and helpless victims who, metaphorically,
have been forcibly strapped to the front of the cannon barrel of affirma-
tive action and have been unjustly punished for the benefit of unharmed
and undeserving Non-Whites.
However, as demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, from a Non-
White perspective, Whites are not accurately characterized as the innocent
victims of Non-White affirmative action; Whites are more accurately
viewed as the displaced beneficiaries of decades of express White affirma-
tive action that was imposed and enforced by both federal and state
government racial preference, with such intensity for so long a time that
contemporary Whites have been deluded into believing that it repre-
sented not racial preference and bias but, simply, the normal and unraced
state of reality. Because of this historic amnesia, like fish in the water,2 80
Whites have ceased to appreciate that their life chances and opportunities
have been suffused with racial preference and advantage engineered and
protected by the State.
In this way, the Court's "historical amnesia" and its use of the rhe-
torical narrative of White innocence can be characterized by what David




279. See President Lyndon B. Johnson's Commencement Address at Howard Univer-
sity (June 4, 1965), reprinted in KATZNELSON, supra note 272, at 175.
280. BROWN Er AL., supra note 6, at 34.
281. Wellman, supra note 227, at 319.
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This constitutional minstrel discourse is both powerful and persua-
sive to Whites because, as Wellman tells us, "[L]ike its earlier incarnation,
the new minstrelsy assures white men who they are not: not unqualified
recipients of unfair advantage, not responsible for past racial injustices, not
beneficiaries of governmental assistance. 28 2 However, this minstrelsy dis-
course also raises new questions that are framed in what Pierre Schlag
calls "value-talk,' 28 3 for example: "What is fair? Who is deserving? By what
criteria are qualification and merit measured?
2 8 4
The Court's use of the rhetorical narrative of White innocence has
been remarkably successful in framing and fueling the general affirmative
action debate. This is partially because innocence constitutes an essential
characteristic of White racial identity and the popular presumption of the
racial neutrality of the law. However, the Court's choice to champion the
cause of White innocence from the White-centered perspective has "fu-
eled rather than dowsed" 28 the racial flames of discord, division, and
distrust in American legal discourse and in the popular imagination.
Paradoxically, the Court's approving use of the language of White
racial innocence has implicitly put the government's rhetorical imprima-
tur on this racialized characterization of innocent White victimization; so
much so, in fact, that this rhetoric and its various permutations now con-
stitute one of the few areas of common ground and uncritical acceptance
among many who fill the ranks of both supporters and opponents of af-
286firmative action programs.
282. Id. at 313.
283. PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL MIND 45 (1996). See also id. at 43 (noting that "[iun this kind of rhetoric, values
become the self-evident starting points and grounds of legal conversations," however, "val-
ues stand as an autonomous realm: values are severed from their generative history, and their
generative history is effaced'").
284. Wellman, supra note 227, at 324.
285. See Goldberg, supra note 90, at 296.
286. For notable examples of affirmative action supporters on the Court expressing
acceptance, at some level, of the ideology of White innocence, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 548
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(noting that "1l]ike the federal provision, Richmond's [set-aside
plan] has a minimal impact on innocent third parties.")(emphasis added); id. at 561 (Black-
mun,J., dissenting) (indicating that "even though one might sympathize with those who-
though possibly innocent themselves-benefit from the wrongs of past decades.") (emphasis
added). See also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHImE: ArFIRMATIVE ACTION,
RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES, 158-59 (1996) (arguing that there is a moral cost to affirma-
tive action programs because of the harm to Whites and suggesting, therefore, that great care
be taken to ensure that there is a particularly clear need for such programs and that they
be carefully limited in scope and duration to match that need); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 60 (Harvard Univ. Press
1991) (arguing that even if Whites are innocent victims of affirmative action programs, it should
not be overlooked that Blacks are innocent too, therefore, "It does no one much good ... to
make race issues contests for some Holy Grail of innocence.").
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Consequently, both sides in the hotly contested affirmative action
debate, both wittingly and unwittingly, accept, reproduce, and reinforce a
rhetorical narrative of contemporary American racial reality that con-
structs and perpetuates a normative association between innocence and
Whiteness. The congruence of opinion affirming a racialized association
between Whiteness and innocence fundamentally undermines any moral
case in support of affirmative action programs and strengthens the moral
basis of its detractors by allowing them to "don the armor of moral inno-
,,2817
cence in their war against affirmative action ....
By deploying the rhetorical narrative of White innocence, the
Court has been able to effectively "alchemize" these "cases about dis-
crimination against disadvantaged groups into narratives in which African
Americans ... seek to deprive white[s] ... of their rightful interests.,28 As
a result, "Invoking 'innocence' has provided the Court with rhetorical
cover for its policy choice[s] ' '289 of either approving or disapproving the
limited use of race as a legitimate selection criterion while simultaneously
advancing the "racial project, 290 of preserving and protecting a status quo
of White dominance and White privilege.
When the Court adopts the White perspective as the presumptive
lens through which to see and describe American racial reality, it ratifies
and emboldens the segment of the public that shares that perspective. In-
stead of engaging the nation in a dialogue in which it acknowledges that
there is more than one appropriate perspective from which to see affirma-
tive action, the Court implicitly endorses the view that there is only one
correct factual description-the White perspective. The Court suggests
that its view is not White at all but in fact a racially-neutral, objective de-
scription of racial reality, rather than the racially White-centered and
biased perspective that fails to even acknowledge that there is a contest
among perspectives.
3. Innocent of Racism
As indicated earlier, one of the defining features of the "innocent of
racism" element of the ideology of White innocence was the notion that
racism is largely a thing of the past in contemporary America, with the
287. Bobo, supra note 245, at 207.
288. Harris, supra note 118, at 580.
289. Id. at 582.
290. A racial project
is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial
dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along par-
ticular racial lines.
MICHAEL OMI & HowARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
1960s TO THE 1990s 56-58 (2d ed., 1994)(emphasis omitted).
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exception of rogue individual racists who act out of a taste for discrimina-
tion. However, from a Non-White-centered-perspective, the problem of
racism is neither solved nor limited solely to individual guilty perpetra-
tors. Instead, Non-Whites perceive systemic racial discrimination that is
"the result of the ways that racial inequalities were embedded in urban
space and urban institutions.
'291
The primary meaning associated with the Court's use of the rheto-
ric of White innocence appears to be focused on a definition of
innocence as the absence of any White moral blameworthiness for racism.
When the Court refers to innocence and equates it with Whiteness, it
could be understood to mean that contemporary Whites are not responsi-
ble or blameworthy for the history and legacy of racism in American
society where "race still matters" so very much in terms of access to the
finer things in life.292
For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,193 Jus-
tice Powell noted, "[T]here is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent
persons in respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing griev-
ances not of their making' '294 The Bakke Court also described innocent
persons as those who "bear no responsibility for whatever harm the bene-
ficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered."
295
In his dissent in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,Justice Souter expressed a
similar sense of White innocence when he said,"[T]he result may be that
some members of the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial
mechanism, however innocent they may be of any personal responsibility
for any discriminatory conduct."2 96 In this sense, innocence is regarded as
the absence of personal responsibility or moral blameworthiness for creat-
ing the racial problems that race-conscious programs like affirmative
action are designed to remedy.
The ideology of White innocence negates the compelling state in-
terest prong of the strict scrutiny standard because it is ultimately based
on a perception of the significance of race as a social problem involving a
sense of proportionality. The finding of a compelling state interest will be
significantly influenced by the extent to which racism is considered a
thing of the past manifested by the rogue individual in isolated and non-
systemic ways, or as a deeply insidious systemic and institutional problem.
By masking the contemporaneous, systemic and institutional nature of
racism in America, the courts can artificially limit the occasions when
affirmative action is deemed to be necessary and appropriate.
291. Sugrue, supra note 240, at 44.
292. See discussion in Section IA, supra.
293. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)(plurality opin-
ion).
294. Id. at 298.
295. Id. at 310.
296. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,270 (1995).
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The Court's focus on the innocent Whites who could be negatively
impacted by race-conscious programs escapes the identification of the
systemic and institutional nature of racial bias. The Court's search for ra-
cial bogey men in the institution's decisional hierarchy, in its recent
historical record, or in an adjudicated finding of actual discrimination,
conveniently allows the Court to avoid the core problem of addressing
racially-discriminatory practices that are deeply embedded into the ma-
chine of racial oppression.
If the Court wants to analyze affirmative action programs against an
assumptive social background of racial reality that views racial discrimina-
tion from a White-centered perspective as a primarily individualistic
dynamic of consciously intentional behavior, then it has the burden of
establishing the factual premises and legal support for that position. In-
stead, the Court simply asserts this view of America's racial reality without
any attempt to document, analyze, or acknowledge either its contested
nature or its severance from a well-known but denied "generative his-
tory.'2 97 The Court merely asserts this perspective as an unraced and
objective report of reality when, in fact, it is little more than a reflection
of a distinctly White-centered perspective of hotly contested racial terrain.
Rather than recognizing that a competing paradigm of racial experience
exists, the Court imposes its own view without support or analysis, sug-
gesting that it is doing nothing more than projecting the personal racial
biases of the Justices as representative of racial reality.
For example, in Croson, Justice Stevens concluded that the city's set-
aside program "stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven
charge of past racial discrimination. 298 In making this argument, Justice
Stevens clearly assumed not only that the racial status quo in the city of
Richmond was neutral but, also, that the White business men engaged in
the construction industry were innocent of racial discrimination. While
the class of White contractors "unquestionably includes some white con-
tractors who are guilty of past discrimination against blacks, but it is only
habit, rather than evidence or analysis, that makes it seem acceptable to
assume that every white contractor covered by the ordinance shares in
that guilt. 2 99 He concluded that this category is clearly overly inclusive
because it "presumably includes ... some [of the white contractors] who
have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of race." °
How did Justice Stevens reach the presumption that at least some of
the White contractors in Richmond had never engaged in racial discrimi-
nation against anyone? He specifically refers to the absence of either "fact
297. SCHLAG, supra note 283, at 43.
298. Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (1989) (Stevens,J., concurring).
299. Id.
300. Id. Justice Stevens concludes that "[i]mposing a common burden on such a dis-
parate class merely because each member of the class is of the same race stems from
reliance on stereotype rather than fact or reason." See id.
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or reason ' 3°1 supporting a blanket indictment of the class, yet he provides
neither fact nor reason in support of his own conclusion of the obvious-
ness of racial innocence among at least some members of this group. His
conclusion smacks of a projection of personal racial bias and is compre-
hensible only from a White-centered perspective.
From a Non-White-centered-perspective, the plaintiff's presentation
of the history of racism, repression, resistance, and avoidance in Rich-
mond supplies ample factual evidence from which to conclude that all of
the White contractors in the city are presumed to have engaged in racial
discrimination absent specific evidence to the contrary.30 2 In contrast, Jus-
tice Stevens' argument clearly presumes the opposite: all Whites are
presumptively non-racist absent evidence to the contrary despite the sub-
stantial evidence of the city's deeply racist past. This view can only be
justified from aWhite-centered perspective.
It is important to note that the City Council in Croson was not
dominated by Blacks bent on revenge against the long years of racist city
government. In fact, the City Council was a racially-mixed group that
had the full support of the White and Black members as well as the sup-
port of the White mayor. When the Court enters into this arena of
political compromise over competing racial perspectives, it is wholly in-
appropriate for it to arbitrarily pick the White perspective as the
controlling matrix by which the constitutionality of the program in ques-
tion is to be judged.
The Court did precisely that, as evidenced by many of its stated
conclusions offered in support of its decision. For example, the Court ar-
gued that the absence of Blacks from meaningful participation in the
construction industry might not be the result of a long history of racial-
ized exclusion by the local contractors, but, rather, Blacks may not have
been inclined to participate in the construction industry in the first place.
As Justice O'Connor observed:
[T]here are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority
participation, including past societal discrimination in educa-
tion and economic opportunities as well as both black and
white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be dis-
proportionately attracted to industries other than construction.
301. Id.
302. Justice Marshall dissenting:
Richmond's leaders had just witnessed decades of publicly sanctioned racial
discrimination in virtually all walks of life--discrimination amply docu-
mented in the decisions of the federal judiciary. This history of'purposefully
unequal treatment' forced upon minorities, not imposed by them, should
raise an inference that minorities in Richmond had much to remedy ....
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 554 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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The mere fact that Black membership in these trade associa-
tions is low, standing alone, cannot establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.3 °3
Just precisely what "other industries" did Justice O'Connor have in
mind that Blacks may be "disproportionately attracted" to? This is a very
disturbing and ominous reference; whatever she had in mind, the very
idea that any racial group would necessarily be inclined to participate or
not in any particular industry, simply on the basis of their racial identifica-
tion, strongly invokes antiquated and rejected notions of racial essentialism
and stereotyping that are supposedly relics of America's racist past. In any
case, they are inappropriate measures for constitutional principles.
4. Innocent of Benefiting from or Perpetuating Racism
From an even longer historical perspective, it has been persuasively
argued that "since the inception of the United States, wealth and institu-
tional support have been invested on the White side of the color line,
leading to an accumulation of economic and social advantages among
European Americans., 30 4 This is hardly surprising since, despite its high-
sounding rhetoric regarding freedom and equality, America was founded
and has lived most of its life as a distinctly White country within which
"[r]ace has long been the axis along which full and genuine membership
in the polity was established and which set the boundaries for determin-





This observation is particularly important because the racial prefer-
ences of contemporary affirmative action in favor of Non-Whites has so
frequently been harshly criticized as "a profound break with an American
tradition of resisting government recognition of [racial] groups that the
real historical record is easily misunderstood.30 6 As Randall Kennedy re-
minds us, discourse regarding America's heralded past of color-blind
reverence for individual merit above all else "is little more than disap-
pointed nostalgia for a golden age that never really existed ' 30 7 and is
303. Croson, 488 U.S. at 503.
304. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 26 (noting "[oln the black side, economic and
institutional disinvestment has been the practice, resulting in a process of disaccumula-
tion.").
305. Bobo, supra note 245, at 207 (noting that "[riace has been so profoundly impli-
cated in American politics that it played the central role in reshaping partisan identities and
party alignments in the post-WorldWar II period.").
306. Id. at 207.
307. Kennedy, supra note 233, at 53.
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simply "the opening wedge of a broader effort to recapture territory 'lost'
in the Civil Rights Revolution ....30
Such nostalgic rhetoric for a mythical American golden age embrac-
ing the tradition of individuality and merit-based opportunities both
denies and obscures the fact that "[e]xplicitly race-based policies, usually
actively antiminority in design, have characterized major social policies in
the United States almost from the very founding of the nation."3 0 9 In fact,
race-based preferences are so characteristic of the entire sweep of Ameri-
can history that "the logic of affirmative action policies, rather than
contradicting the American historical pattern, is actually entirely consis-
tent with it."
310
The most important shift in focus (among others) that scholars rec-
ommend involves changing our "historical attention span." '' This
historical shift results in focusing not on the affirmative action policies
begun forty years ago during the Civil Rights era, but, rather, going back
seventy years to the policies instituted in Roosevelt's New Deal and the
impact their legacies have had on contemporary economic and political
racial reality.312 Katznelson perceptively argues that such a shift in our his-
torical perspective on affirmative action will reveal a largely erased and
"mainly neglected earlier history of race and public policy" that will "al-
low us to see, think, and act about affirmative action in fresh ways.,3 13
This fresh new historical perspective reveals a recent, profound, and
massive system of government mandated preferences and privileges to
Whites at the expense of Blacks that had almost nothing to do with merit
and almost everything to do with race. However, because of a profound
sense of "historical amnesia," we have forgotten about how recently "all
the major tools [of] the federal government [were] deployed during the
New Deal and the Fair Deal [to] create a powerful, if unstated, program of
affirmative action for white[s] .... [that formulated a] recent record of
profound and pervasive racial bias" in favor of whites at the expense of
308. Id. 59-60.
309. Bobo, supra note 245, at 207 (citing Ronald T. Takaki, Reflections on Racial Pat-
terns in America, in FROM DFFERETr SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN
AMERICA (Ronald T.Takaki ed., 1994)).
310. Id. (citing SKRENTN-v, supra note 238.
311. KATZNELSON, supra note 278, at xi.
312. Id. at 160-61 (noting how the "powerful negative effects" of these policies "have
compounded in the past two generations .... ); BROWN ET At., supra note 6, at 26 (ob-
serving that "Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies were instrumental to both the cause of racial
equality and the perpetuation of racial inequality.").
313. Id. at xi. See also id. at 21 (noting that "As the great agent of social policy change
in the New Deal and postwar periods, [the] Democratic Party partnership of'strange bed-
fellows' produced a series of 'strange deals' that, together, constituted a program of
affirmative action granting white Americans privileged access to state-sponsored economic
mobility.").
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Blacks."314 Katznelson urges Americans to remember that, beginning with
Roosevelt's New Deal programs that have had enormous implications for
the present day,
[a]ffirmative action then was white. New national policies en-
acted in the pre-civil rights, last-gasp era of Jim Crow
constituted a massive transfer of quite specific privileges to
white Americans. New programs produced economic and so-
cial opportunity for favored constituencies and thus widened
the gap between white and black Americans in the aftermath
of the Second World War. And the effects ... did not stop even
after discriminatory codes were swept aside by the civil rights
movement and the legislation it inspired. 35
This is a critically important historical and analytical perspective to be
kept in mind in evaluating contemporary affirmative action policies in
favor of Non-Whites. Sniderman and Carmines observe that it is a sense
of "racial double standards" that fuels White "anger" and a "sense of be-
316trayal" at Non-White affirmative action.
However, if these same Whites who are so angry and feel so be-
trayed by what they perceive to be "racial double standards" in favor of
Non-White affirmative action were themselves the direct beneficiaries of
White affirmative action based on precisely the same kind of "racial dou-
ble standards," then their anger becomes quite problematic. From this
perspective, such feelings can only be regarded, at best, as profoundly
hypocritical and, at worst, completely disingenuous. It suggests that, at its
core, this stripe of White resentment is not based on racial standards at all,
but on racial double standards that do not benefit Whites. At the very
least, it renders this White opposition completely unprincipled and based
on "sour grapes" that the very same state-sponsored racial double stan-
dards providing them entry into the middle class, thereby securing their
economic and social success, should now be used for other racial groups.
As Katznelson rightly suggests, this fresh new historical perspective
on affirmative action, which is not focused on ancestors long dead but,
instead, on the living generation here and now, completely alters the af-
firmative action debate. It deprives contemporary Whites of any
principled basis upon which to object to so-called racial double standards
per se, and reveals that such objections are reduced to nothing more than
saying that racial double standards of government preference are com-
pletely unobjectionable so long as they are primarily targeted to and
benefit Whites, but are completely objectionable when they benefit Non-
Whites, in general, and Blacks in particular.
314. Id. at 161.
315. Id. at 23.
316. SNIDERMAN & CARMINEs, supra note 5, at 102-103.
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Cast in this light, it is difficult to avoid characterizing such objec-
tions as not only nakedly hypocritical, but also as anything other than
profoundly racist. When regarded from this perspective, it is not surprising
that the current generation of Whites has engaged in a form of willful
amnesia about the very policies and government racial preferences which
created the modern White middle class.
To be sure, the New Deal is not all a one-sided picture of White benefits
and Non-White burdens. Blacks and other Non-Whites benefited from
the New Deal's sweeping social legislation, too. As it has been observed, it
is beyond question that "African Americans benefited from New Deal
policies. They gained from the growth of public employment and gov-
ernmental transfers like social security and welfare."3 " However, there is
equally no question that "[t]he New Deal's class-based, or race-neutral,
social policies did not affect blacks and whites in identical ways. ' 18 Most
importantly, because of the deliberately racialized way in which these
programs were administered and targeted to Whites1 9 and "riddled with
discrimination, ,"0 they "contributed disproportionately to the prosperity
of the white middle class from the 1940s on.
' 32'
A detailed exposition of the myriad ways in which many of the
New Deal policies amounted to affirmative action for Whites whose
"powerful negative effects have compounded in the past two genera-
tions,"322 is beyond the scope of this Article and must wait for another day.
However, for purposes of this Article it is important to note that there was
one set of New Deal programs that have particular significance to the
contemporary debate on affirmative action.
Arguably, the most important New Deal policies that can be accu-
rately characterized as affirmative action for Whites dealt with the federal
government's intervention into the home ownership financing market.
These programs have a relative primacy among New Deal policies for the
purposes of this Article; first, because of the blatant and explicit manner in
which it granted massive and transformative government preferences to
Whites at the expense of Blacks, and second, because of the enormity of
their intergenerational consequences to the present day in creating and
exacerbating racial inequality along a number of important matrices.
317. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 27.
318. Id. (further noting that "if [New Deal] federal social policy promoted racial
equality, it also created and sustained racial hierarchies. Welfare states are as much instru-
ments of stratification as they are of equality.").
319. See KATZNELSON, supra note 278, at 160-61 (noting that "[t]he history of advan-
tages offered to most whites and denied to many blacks in New Deal and Fair Deal
policies is a particular story of targeted official institutional bias and great consequence
.... [that was] racially skewed by design ......
320. BROWN ET AL., supra note 6, at 27.
321. Id.
322. KATZNELSON, supra note 278, at 160-61.
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Prior to the federal government's massive intervention into the pri-
vate home financing market through New Deal programs, the process of
323financing a home was vastly different than it is today. After the
"economic devastation of the Great Depression [which] inflicted crip-
pling damage to both the homeowner and the housing industry
"' 324
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created three New Deal Programs that
forever transformed the housing purchase and financing market.325 These
programs consisted of the Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC),
created in 1933 by the Home Owners' Loan Act, 326 the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), established in 1934,327 and the Veteran's Admini-
stration (VA) in 1944.
328
The principal contributions of the HOLC and the FHA to the es-
tablishment of White affirmative action was their creation, perpetuation,
and popularization of the practice of racialized "redlining" in which
neighborhoods occupied by Blacks were colored in red on agency maps
and assigned the lowest rank of acceptable loan risk 329 As a direct result,
the practice of regarding Black and other Non-White neighborhoods as
the most undesirable and hazardous in which to make loans, the federal
government institutionalized the redlining mentality in the lending com-
munity. As a result, "[M]any avenues of credit for future home buyers
[were closed] since private lending institutions adopted the HOLC's dis-
criminatory policies, and the HOLC policies also significantly influenced
how the Fair Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration
decided to underwrite loans. 3
More importantly, not only did the FHA adopt the HOLC's redlin-
ing practice, but it actually went even further. As Charles Abrams has
323. See Fred Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and Fore-
closure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great Depression, 57 ALA.
L. REV. 231, 232 (2005) (noting that the "American system of real estate finance that
emerged from the New Deal was remarkably different from the system that existed during
the Great Depression.").
324. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 619
(1999).
325. See Wright, supra note 323, 232, (noting how the Home Owner's Loan Corpo-
ration and the Federal Housing Administration "revolutionized how Americans bought
homes.").
326. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Own-
ers Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, 6 URn. HIsT. 419,422 (1980). See
also Wright, supra note 323.
327. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 203 (1985) (noting that "[n]o agency of the United States government has
had a more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people over the past half-
century than the Federal Housing Administration.").
328. Id. at 204.
329. Wright, supra note 323, at 245.
330. Id.
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persuasively argued, it "adopted a racial policy that could well have been
culled from the Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA .... sent its
agents into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying
homes in white neighborhoods., 33 As Florence Wagman Roisman has
observed, the FHA's "role was crucial: [it] exhorted segregation and en-
shrined it as public policy; it was the first time in our national history that
a federal agency had openly exhorted segregation.
'332
The FHA's policies of protecting White neighborhoods from inte-
gration by Blacks and other minorities was so extreme that, as Martha
Mahoney has noted, "The agency categorized occupancy by racial mi-
norities with other nuisances to be guarded against for their impact on an
area, such as the presence of'stables' or 'pig pens.' 33 Moreover, the FHA
also "advocated the racially restrictive covenant so energetically that the
idea spread throughout the country. Builders everywhere adopted the
covenant so their property would be eligible for FHA insurance in the
future.
'334
The FHA was remarkably successful in stimulating the development
of new housing in the suburbs and stemming the tide of foreclosures.
However, because of its intense segregationist requirements, the price of
this enormous housing boon to Whites was borne by Blacks who were
trapped in the inner city in multifamily and attached housing for which
the FHA refused to insure mortgages. 33' The damage caused by the FHA
331. CaHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING
229 (1955). See also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDER CLASS 54-55 (1993) (noting the FHA's role in
promoting and perpetuating residential segregation after World War II that persists to this
day); JACKSON, supra note 327, at 213 (noting that the "FHA exhorted segregation and
enshrined it as public policy"); MELVIN OLVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITF WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 17 (1985) (noting the
continuing intergenerational significance of the FHA's white racial preferences in the New
Deal on the contemporary disparities in wealth between Blacks and Whites today in the
form of home ownership).
332. Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and
Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IowA L. REV. 479, 491 (1995) (citing
JACKSON, supra note 368, at 213, and ABRAMS, supra note 373, at 234).
333. Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in
New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1989) (citing ABRAMS, supra note 373, at 229).
334. Id. See also Nier, supra note 324, at 626 (noting that not only did the FHIA Un-
derwriting Manual recommended that subdivisions adopt racially restrictive covenants but,
remarkably, the agency did not "officially change this policy until February 1950, two
years after racial covenants were declared unenforceable and contrary to public policy by
the United States Supreme Court."); CLEMENT E.VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME
COURT, THE NAACP, AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 225-27 (1959) (noting that after
the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the FHA waited until
February 15, 1950 to refuse to insure properties with new covenants not at all affecting
those racially restrictive covenants already in place).
335. See Nier, supra note 324, at 625.
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policies directing federal loan guarantees to Whites residing in the suburbs
was not only that it recognized and ratified existing social bias against
Blacks and other Non-White peoples, but that it put the government's
"seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination ... [leading to] the
practical abandonment of large sections of older, industrialized cities.
336
These New Deal home financing policies are critically important
today because as Oliver and Shapiro have persuasively observed "[hiome
ownership is without question the single most important means of accu-
mulating assets" '337 and thereby creating wealth. Moreover, as Thomas
Shapiro has effectively demonstrated, homeownership is not only the
"bedrock of the American Dream," it "also is the way families gain access
to the nicest communities, the best public services, and most important
... quality education. Homeownership is the most critical pathway to
transformative assets."338 Shapiro describes these transformative assets as
"head-start assets," 339 that, in light of the prior analysis, are unearned in-
herited assets from previous generations achieved during explicit New
Deal governmental preferences for Whites at the expense of Blacks and
other Non-Whites.
The consequences of this recent affirmative action for Whites are
staggering. The accumulated wealth represented principally by homes
purchased through New Deal White affirmative action and appreciation
over the last fifty years has led to a situation where "[t]he baby boom gen-
eration, which grew up during a long period of economic prosperity
right after World War II, is in the midst of benefiting from the greatest
inheritance of wealth in history.''34° It is estimated that "parents will be-
queath $9 trillion to their adult children between 1990 and 2030 ... [and]
this wealth inheritance will exacerbate already rising inequality.
34'
This New-Deal generated, homeowner-based, baby-boomer bo-
nanza is almost exclusively White. Blacks and other Non-Whites who
were left out of the massive government racial preferences during the
New Deal and its aftermath did not participate in this wealth transfer.
Instead, it is far more typical for today's educated Black and Non-White
professional to have to bear the cost of supporting their parents who, in
old age, have few, if any, assets upon which to cushion their elder years.
Most importantly, when regarded from this wealth perspective,
336. Id. at 627 (citingJACKSON, supra note 327, at 217).
337. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 331, at 8.
338. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING ARmcAN AMERCAN: How
WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 3 (2004).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 5.
341. Id. at 5 (citing Robert Avery & Robert Rendall, Estimating the Size and Distribu-
tion of Baby Boomer's Prospective Inheritances, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE
SECTION OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION (1993)).
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"[H]omeownership [gains] are reversing gains earned in schools and on
jobs and making racial inequality worse.!42
This is a critical observation because "[f]amily inheritance is more
encompassing than money passed at death, because for young adults it
often includes paying for college, substantial down-payment assistance in
buying a first home, and other continuing parental financial assistance.,
343
And most distressingly, as a consequence "it is virtually impossible for
people of color to earn their way to equal wealth through wages. No
matter how much blacks earn, they cannot preserve their occupational
status for their children; they cannot outearn the wealth gap., 344 A gap
whose seeds were sown in New Deal affirmative action for Whites and
whose intergenerational effects are continuing to reverberate into the
twenty-first century.Viewed from this perspective, "[T]he crucial role that
private family wealth plays in our communities and in our schools to per-
petuate inequality from one generation to the next .... which have
virtually nothing to do with merit.,
34
1
C. The Problem with the Court's White-Centered Regime
The essence of the Court's error in choosing a particular racial per-
spective to control its view of racially-inflected claims is not necessarily
that it has made the wrong choice. The important point is that is has
made a choice at all. The metaphysical truth of the competing racial per-
spectives is not within the Court's province. The practical realities of
efficiently and constitutionally managing the affairs of state are the only
duties with which the Court may be legitimately concerned. Where the
competing racial perspectives have reached a fair and acceptable compro-
mise in the political process, the Court has no constitutional basis to
interfere.346
Part of the Court's problem in this regard stems from what many re-
gard as its misunderstanding of the moral imperative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Justices Kennedy and Scalia have explicitly endorsed a
view that considers "the moral imperative" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as nothing more than "racial neutrality.' 347 That is a technical and
342. SHAPIRO, supra note 338, at 2.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 10.
346. See TRIBE, supra note 257, at 365 (Which requires courts to "avoid deciding
political questions"). See also Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the
Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303 (1996). But see Earl M. Maltz, Political
Questions and Representational Politics: A Comment on Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 711
(1995) (calling for the retention and expansion of the political question doctrine); Louis
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YAIE L.J. 597 (1976).
347. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518.
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superficial reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that can withstand nei-
ther historical nor rational scrutiny. Although it does not exhaust the
Amendment, one of its principal purposes was the elimination of racial
caste in America. As Cass Sunstein has persuasively argued in describing
the "anticaste principle,014 s "An important purpose of the Civil War
Amendments was the attack on racial caste.' 34 9 The moral imperative of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as all of the Civil War Amendments,
was not to achieve racial neutrality as an end in itself, but, rather, only to
use it as one tool among many to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating
the sense of racial caste that had sustained slavery for over 200 years.
The Court's willingness to project its own racial views is apparent in
other contexts as well. For example, in Richmond v.JA. Croson, the Court
argues that the affirmative action plan endorsed by the city will likely
have a negative impact on Black business people who would benefit from
it. As Justice Stevens argues in his concurrence, "Although [the plan] stig-
matizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past
discrimination, it actually imposes a greater stigma on its supposed benefi-
ciaries."',3 The disadvantage that Justice Stevens had in mind is caused by
the fact that, as he observed, "[A] statute of this kind inevitably is per-
ceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted
this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified
purely by their race.
351
Reflecting on Justice Stevens' assertion, a few questions quickly
come to mind. First, what is the source ofJustice Stevens' knowledge and
what is his authority to posit such a proposition? Next, who are the
"many" that will perceive affirmative action programs in this way? More-
over, why does their view weigh so heavily with the Court? Justice
Stevens' primary legal authority for this proposition is his own opinion in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, which he quotes at length.3' 2 Clearly, the "many" that
Justice Stevens had in mind consists of those he refers to as the "disfavored
group," that is, Whites. Thus, Justice Stevens is explicitly arguing that be-
cause the White perspective will view this program negatively and will
regard its beneficiaries as "less qualified," somehow that unintended con-
sequence is a constitutionally cognizable consideration of sufficient
importance to weigh heavily in favor of overturning the program. As if to
emphasize what he apparently believes is a strongly made point, he fol-
348. Cass Sunstein, TheAnticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2411 (1994) (defin-
ing the anticaste principle as "forbid[ing] social and legal practices from translating highly
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systematic social disadvantage, unless there is
a very good reason for society to do so.").
349. Id. at 2435.
350. Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens,J., concurring).
351. Id. at 517 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,545 (1980)).
352. See id.
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lows the extensive quoted passage from Fullilove by concluding with "ac-
cordingly, I concur .... ,353
As Tim Wise has observed, to argue that affirmative action harms its
recipients by creating a stigma that damages their self-esteem "completely
ignores that racism itself" is the true assault on "the dignity and self-
esteem of its targets." 3 4 Wise also observes that the argument that affirma-
tive action harms the self-esteem of it recipients is fundamentally racist in
its orientation. This is because, as Wise has pointed out, given the fact that
Blacks, for example, support affirmative action polices by a margin of 6:1,
they must be either "too stupid to see when they are being insulted, or
.... simply do not mind being insulted. To accept the stigma argument
requires first believing that the answer to at least one of these fundamen-
tally racist questions is yes.
"3
11
Interestingly, the Court also fails to compare the potential stigma to
the beneficiaries of race-based preferences with the experiences of other
groups that also receive preferential consideration for admission to higher
education, such as the children of alumni, wealthy donors, athletes and
musicians. Of course, because the Court has failed to recognize it, there is
also no mention of the potential stigmatizing effects of racial preferences
that were" given to Whites under the transformative New Deal policies.
Thus, it appears that in the Court's unsupported view, preferential treat-
ment is stigmatizing not only just to Non-Whites, but to Non-Whites
who also happen not to be children of alumni, wealthy donors, athletes or
musicians. Under these auspices, the stigma argument seems not only irra-
tional and unworthy of intelligent argument and constitutional
consideration, but is also based on nothing more than the personal biases
of those who assert it.
However, having judicially noticed the White-centered perspective
as the appropriate lens through which to view race-inflected constitu-
tional claims, and without any evidentiary support whatsoever, the Court
does not then measure it against the Non-White perspective and engage in
a rational balancing of approaches. In fact, no other perspectives are even
acknowledged, much less measured or evaluated leaving the indelible im-
pression that the White perspective not only exhausts the possibilities but
also reflects the personal views of the individual Justices on the Court.5 6
353. Id. at 518.
354. TIM WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 128
(2005) (also observing that the self-esteem of affirmative action recipients would be more
damaged by being denied admission or employment than by being given an opportunity
to prove oneself).
355. Id. at 126.
356. See generally Catherine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic
Reflections on the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323 (1992). See also Sherrilyn A.
Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE
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Do Non-Whites generally agree with this view? Do Blacks generally
agree? Do past Black beneficiaries agree? The Court does not know, does
not ask, and is apparently not interested in knowing. Instead, its rhetorical
language clearly suggests that in the Court's mind, there is only one ra-
tional perspective on this issue and it is articulated in the White
perspective of the "many." Thus, the perspectives, experiences, and opin-
ions of the beneficiaries is not relevant because, in the Court's view, the
White-centered perspective can determine the existence of stigma even
better than those who allegedly suffer from its burden.
However, even ifJustice Stevens' prediction of the White reaction is
correct, why is it constitutionally relevant? Unfortunately, he neither raises
the question nor provides any answer. In addition, his argument suggests
that the degree of resentment and disrespect by the "many" who share the
White perspective on this matter will somehow be different than their
current view of the beneficiary group if these programs were overturned.
From a Non-White-centered perspective it can be reasonably ar-
gued that, in reality, the degree of racism, of racial disrespect, and
resentment of Whites toward Non-Whites-especially Blacks, and espe-
cially in the South--did not begin with affirmative action and would not
end if affirmative action disappeared tomorrow. Such disrespect and low
regard for Blacks by Whites already exists, not only in the South but all
over America, and to such a high degree that whatever incremental addi-
tion may have been caused by Richmond's program would be but a drop
in the proverbial bucket of racism. In short, it would make little or no
difference at all in the ambient degree of White resentment.
Thus, the Court fails to adequately justify its choice of the White
perspective on the issue of resentment and disrespect. Moreover, it also
does not explain why White resentment, in any particular manifestation,
even if engendered by this program, would make a difference in the racial
status quo. Interestingly, Justice Stevens' argument in Fullilove, repeated in
Croson, and cited in Grutter by Justice O'Connor, suggests that the mere
fact that White resentment exists at all, in whatever degree, is not only
automatically constitutionally cognizable, but in some unknown amount
constitutionally determinative. This approach also suggests complete disre-
gard of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
that Non-White resentment has not received comparable constitutional
consideration. In fact, it has received far less than a comparable amount of
consideration-it has received none at all. From a constitutional perspec-
tive, it appears that racial resentment is only relevant if it is White. This
analysis hardly comports with any reasonable reading of the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
L. R-v. 405 (2000) (discussing outsider perspectives); Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmak-
ing, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990) (discussing contextual decisionmaking).
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Finally, there is one additional problem with Justice Stevens' argu-
ment that again emphasizes its profound racially-influenced quality. His
conclusion regarding negative assumptions about the qualifications of the
beneficiaries of racial preference programs does not seem to apply outside
of racially-targeted programs. For example, there is no discussion of simi-
lar assumptions regarding the beneficiaries of veteran's preference
programs or legacy preference programs. Either Stevens is wrong about
the reaction to preference programs generally or, more likely, the resent-
ment he anticipates would not stem from an inference that the
beneficiaries must be deficient in the same way that Whites would project
such a label on Non-Whites as beneficiaries of racial-preference pro-
357grams.
III. DUE PROCESS AND THEWHITE-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE
The rhetoric of White innocence creates and perpetuates a mythol-
ogy of a generalized racial "innocence of law""" which considers the legal
landscape to be free of systemic racial biases absent the insertion of race
through affirmative action programs. This approach is also problematic
because "[t]he Court presumes the institutions and institutional practices
it defers to are neutral, natural, and necessary, failing to recognize how




357. Note the absence of any similar criticism of legacy admits to elite colleges and
graduate schools, where, given the history of White affirmative action, the schools are
likely to be predominantly White.
358. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 164, at 119 ("In liberal views of the world, law is
manifestly incompatible with racism .... [but] racism is compatible with and even integral
to law."). Explicit governmental use of racial categories to benefit Non-Whites in the
competition for government benefits is presumed to take place in racially-neutral territory
and to be devoid of existing racially-determinative influences. Explicit racial remedies are
thus presumed to intrude upon a racially-pristine canvass uncontaminated by pre-existing
and outcome-determinative elements of highly racialized preference, privilege, and advan-
tage.
359. Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LoY.
L.A. L. R v 923,925 (1995).Winkler observes that:
The social environment in which institutions arise impinges upon and
shapes those regimes and operations. Yet the Court bases its reasoning on
idealized versions of American institutions, decontextualized from the real
world of American experience. Consequently, the Court does not notice
how the general attitudes of prejudice and racism in society infect and infil-
trate the very institutions to which the Court defers. If racism has
contaminated the structure and operation of institutions, then there is con-
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In this way, the constitutional rhetoric of White innocence rein-
forces White supremacy by legitimating the status quo as the product of
racially-neutral social, political and individualistic decisions and discursive
dynamics. Rather than being constructed by systemic and institutional
racist practices and stereotypes, it posits that racism is only problematic to
the extent that it is the product of the blameworthy actions of individual
bad actors who are motivated by conscious and intentional racism. In this
way, it reinforces the broad discursive innocence of Whites collectively by
locating racially discriminatory behavior outside the normative structure
ofWhiteness, and characterizing it as aberrant and individualistic.
The Due Process Clause, "like its forebear in the Magna Carta ... was
'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government' .... ,,360 Due process, in both procedural and substantive
contexts, necessarily presumes rationality, materiality and reasonableness.
That is, the essence of the Due Process Clause is a guarantee of a degree of
reasonableness that matters-that makes a difference in the outcome.
Thus, in terms of procedural due process, it follows that a process
that makes no difference on the outcome is, in fact, no process at all 6
Thus, if the White-centered perspective always wins, and in so doing
achieves a kind of unquestioned hegemony, it cannot be said to have been
the result of a reasonable process. Instead, it is evidence of a deeply-flawed
and broken process that has in a very real sense made Whiteness the
measure of realness. The choice for Non-Whites under this despotic rule
of the White perspective has been to either allow it to supplant their own
racialized experiences of the world, or to achieve a type of"bi-visuality"
whereby they can be visually fluent in both racial perspectives.
Non-Whites in America have always struggled to achieve a degree
of mastery over this kind of racial bi-visuality of perspective as a survival
362mechanism. The need for such fluency began when the first chains of
racialized slavery were forged in the English colonies and continues to the
present day to impress itself with frightening speed, intensity, and clarity
on every Non-White in America.3 6 3 For Non-Whites in America, racial
360. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235,
244 (1819)).
361. See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REv. 493 (1997). See also James W Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999).
362. HOOKS, supra note 16, at 31("black folks have, from slavery on, shared in conver-
sations with one another 'special' knowledge of whiteness gleaned from close scrutiny of
white people.").
363. See Devon W Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946,
958-59 (2002) (describing the British author's racial initiation with his brother in the
United States upon their first contact with American police). See generally WINTHROP D.
JORDAM, WHTE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TowARD THE NEGRO (1968); Devon W
Carbado, Motherhood and Work in Cultural Context: One Woman's Patriarchal Bargain, 21
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bi-visual fluency is an essential survival skill. Some Non-Whites have al-
ways absorbed and accepted the White-centered perspective as their own
and even preached it to their fellows;364 however, the vast majority have
historically chosen-and continue to choose-bi-visual fluency over total
surrender, occupation, and linguistic colonization of perspective by the
White-centered perspective. 365
Through the lens of the White-centered perspective, not only are
Whites perceived to be innocent, but the law itself is innocent of racial
bias. The ideological underpinnings of this view are a form of judicial
self-inflicted colorblindness, whereby the Court and the general public
presume the law itself to be free of racial inflection, presumption or bias.
From the Non-White-centered perspective, the law constitutes a primary
engine in the creation and perpetuation of both race itself and the raciali-
zation of society.When the Court adopts one of these perspectives as the
controlling lens of a case, it has an obligation, at a minimum, to explain its
choice in order to comport with due process.
Instead, the Court chooses the White-centered perspective not as
the prevailing party in a contest between combatants, but rather as the
naturally or divinely anointed clairvoyant of reality, as if there were never
any real choice to make. This choice is supported by neither reason nor
logic, and thus, at its core, it represents a fundamentally arbitrary assertion
of governmental power that is anathema to a system grounded on due
process guarantees. Any process that results in arbitrary decisions cannot
possibly lay claim to being either a "due process," or a process consistent
with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.366 In addition, this
choice constitutes a clear, unconstitutional racial preference by govern-
ment without even a colorable claim to advance a compelling state
interest that is also narrowly-tailored. Thus, seeing racial reality through
the White-centered perspective inclines the Court to make arbitrary racial
HARv.WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1998); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA; EQUAL CITIZEN-
SHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
364. See generally JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK
AMERICA (2000).
365. bell hooks notes:
One must face written histories that erase and deny, that reinvent the past to
make the present vision of racial harmony and pluralism more plausible. To
bear the burden of memory one must be willing to journey to places long
uninhabited, searching the debris of history for traces of the unforgettable, all
knowledge of which has been suppressed.
See HOOKS, supra note 16, at 41
366. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) ("No reason for [the dis-
crimination] is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists
except hostility to the race [of the beneficiary of affirmative action] ... which in the eye
of the law is not justified.").
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preferences in favor of Whiteness that are antipodal, or simultaneously
irrational, glaringly obvious, and totally invisible.
IV RECOMMENDATION
This Article's primary recommendation is for the Court, first, to ac-
knowledge that there are, in fact, competing perspectives of racial reality;
and then, to show its analysis and methodology for utilizing whichever
perspective it ultimately adopts in jurisprudence dealing with race-based
claims. If the Court were to implement the analytical approach that this
Article suggests, it could have significant implications for both the results
and the constitutional analysis for future race cases. For example, if we
were to apply this approach to CrosonJustice Scalia could not have simply
argued that the Constitution forbids racial categorization per se and, thus,
cannot accommodate the notion of benign discrimination. He would
have been constrained to acknowledge that although this reflects a legiti-
mate construction of the Constitution, it is also based on a distinctly
White-centered perspective. Public honesty would have then compelled
him to acknowledge that from a Non-White-centered perspective-and
especially a Black perspective-the racial prohibitions of the Civil War
Amendments are fundamentally anti-subordination in character and were
intended to police racial categories only to the extent that they contrib-
uted to the creation and perpetuation of a system of subordination and
racial caste.36 7
If Scalia had been constrained to choose rhetorical constitutional
narratives that recognized multiple legitimate racial perspectives instead of
imposing an unexamined judicial notice of the White-centered perspec-
tive as the presumptive lens through which to perceive racial reality, he
would have taken an important step forward toward meaningful racial
equality. Under this logic, he would have had to acknowledge that the
Reconstruction Amendments were aptly named, because their aim was to
quite literally reconstruct and, indeed, reimagine the principled basis for
the American Republic. In this light, it would have been clear that the
intent of the framers of these "re-founding documents" was not simply to
eliminate race from the governmental lexicon. Rather, it was to solve the
great problem that was before them: to disempower race as a powerful
and immutable engine of social caste.
36 8
367. See Sunstein, supra note 348. See also Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The
American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, in Yale Law School
Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 34 SSRN
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=380800
368. See generally WE.B. Du Bois, BLAcK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 328 (First
Free Press Edition 1998)(1935) (describing the near national consensus from 1864 to 1868
that the primary purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments was to protect the emanci-
pated slaves).
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From this perspective, racial classifications by the state are perfectly
legitimate, so long as they do not create or perpetuate a system of subor-
dinate racial caste. Although Justice Stevens argued in Croson that the
White businesses not favored under the city's plan were stigmatized by the
369
program, there can be no serious argument that affirmative action pro-
grams have in any way contributed to incarcerating Whites as a group to a
lower and subordinated social class. In other words, from the Non-White
perspective, benign discrimination plans by government do not run afoul
of the anti-discrimination prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
unless and until Whites as a group are realistically threatened with being
reduced to a socially-subordinate lower caste. Given the overwhelming
concentration of Whites in positions of power, and their vastly dispropor-
tionate control of the nation's wealth, it is unlikely in the extreme that
such a subordinate status for Whites could occur within foreseeable his-
torical time.
Having distinguished the two competing threshold perspectives and
the logical extension of both, one disallowing all racial categories on a per
se basis and the other condemning such classifications strictly under the
anti-subordination principle, how then does the Court justify a choice of
one over the other? Neither has an exclusive command of the truth. Each
is premised on a distinctly racialized view of reality, and based on that
foundation, leads rationally to its conclusion. How, then, should the Court
break the tie between competing racialized perspectives in a principled
way? Whichever perspective the Justices choose and explain in a more
transparent process, their reasoning would expose and reveal a great deal
about their thinking with respect to the racial perspectives appropriate for
the law to consider in satisfying both the due process and equal protec-
tion constitutional mandates.
Although a simple national majoritarian justification might be a se-
ductive option for the adoption of the White-centered perspective, it must
be rejected because, at a minimum, it would inexorably lead to difficulty in
those jurisdictions where Whites have already become or are fast becoming
a numerical minority.370 Nationally, it has been estimated that somewhere
between 2025-2050 America will cease to have a numerically-dominant
369. Ironically, Justice Stevens refers to the city's set aside program as stigmatizing
"the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination;" however,
he does offers neither evidentiary support nor analytical engagement beyond his own
personal and racialized view that this group-White contractors-has in fact been stigma-
tized at all. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 516. Interestingly, Justice Stevens never explains why
Whites are stigmatized by being denied benefirts from affirmative action programs, while
Non-Whites are stigmatized for being granted those very same benefits. In the Court's
tortured logic it appears that the stigmatizing effect of affirmative action can be a function
of being both a beneficiary and a non-beneficiary of such benefits.
370. See Ross, supra note 18, at 224-25 (2005) (describing the increased "browning"
of America, particularly in states like California, which is projected to be a majority-
minority state by the middle of the century).
SPRING 20061
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
majority race.37 Thus, this would not only be highly problematic from a
principled basis perspective; but also, with Whites as a racial group in clear
and inexorable decline as a numerical majority, a majoritarian basis would
be very thin and shifting ground upon which to base a tie-breaking pref-
erence between the competing racial perspectives. Judicial expressions of
personal identification, sympathy or bias with either racialized perspective
would also be obviously inappropriate bases for distinction as well.
A principled and rationally-articulated, non-race based distinction
between the two perspectives would indeed be difficult, if not impossible.
And perhaps that is precisely the point. Instead of framing the debate as a
stark choice between racialized perspectives, the more principled solution
may well be the adoption of a method to accommodate more than a sin-
gle monopolistic racialized perspective. In this way, the Court would then
be forced to consider ways to compromise between perspectives and,
unlike the status quo, acknowledge a high degree of respect for multiple
perspectives on racial reality. The ultimate result would be a product of
policy and practicality rather than one fraudulently alleged to derive from
a race-neutral application of pure reason.
As a compromise, considering multiple perspectives would not likely
satisfy either side completely, but at least both sides would participate to
some degree in the final result. There would be no clear winner but no
clear loser either. This solution would envision, a mutual recognition of
competing multiple perspectives as being legitimate reports of racial real-
ity, worthy of both judicial respect and consideration. This would not be
easy of course. And an important threshold requirement for judging in
this fashion would be for judges to be required to pay "attention ... [and
become] more self-conscious about the ways 'personal history, character,
and outlook' impact the decisions and interactions with which we engage
the world.
372
This approach is consistent with the finest traditions of participatory
democracy and, in fact, precisely reflects the constitutional origins of the
American experiment in popular government. In addition, as the epi-
graph of this Article indicated, once judges acknowledge that they are
indeed "situated" and have a racialized "point of view," their primary task
371. See id. at 224 (citing ELIZABETH M. GREico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE
POPULATION: 2000 (2002)) (noting the decrease in the White national majority over the
last 60 years from 90% to 77%). See also Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Working Paper No. 56, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULATION TOTALS By
RACE, 1790 To 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970 To 1990, FOR THE UNITED STATES,
REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES tbl. 1 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/documentation/twps0056/twpsOO56.pdf.
372. Wildman, supra note 57, at 264. See also Wells, supra note 356, at 401 (noting that
judging is by its nature a situated activity); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATuRE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921) (noting the inherent situated quality ofjudging and conclud-
ing that "[w]e may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can
never see them with any eyes except our own.").
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is to "identify vantage points, to learn how to adopt contrasting vantage
points, and to decide which vantage points to embrace in given circum-
stances. 373 At a minimum, this approach requires the abandonment of any
notion of a racial default perspective in adjudicating constitutional race
cases, whether it be White or Non-White.
In the final analysis, the difficulty of implementing this solution is
one of its principle attributes. As Martha Minnow has observed, "struggles
over descriptions of reality '374 is a good thing and not something to be
rightly feared. This is a struggle over the value-talk of "racial justice;" and
justice, whether racial or otherwise, "is the quality of human engagement
with multiple perspectives framed by, but not limited to, the relationships
of power in which they are formed. '37 1 Critics may charge that the ap-
proach suggested here poses an inherent danger of putting all of
constitutional racial jurisprudence, what Pierre Schlag describes as "our
whole normative universe, ' 37 6 into question. In response, I embrace
Schlag's eloquent rejoinder to such critics: "[I]t is only a frightened or




The normative deployment of the rhetoric of White innocence in
the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence demonstrate that
the Court is unreflectively locked into a White-centered perspective or
master framework in terms of its ability to perceive and understand
America's racial reality. As a consequence, this racially-limited perspective
distorts the Court's appreciation for the full and balanced texture of racial
reality in contemporary America, both limiting its analysis and dooming
its remedies in combating the nation's real and intractable racial problems.
The answer to this problem is simultaneously deceptively simple and
abstractly complex. It begins with a simple act, as captured in the epigraph
of this Article, of recognizing that "any point of view, including one's own,
is a point of view."37 From this simple act comes an implicit recognition
of the existence and validation of opposing points of view. In this way,
those who are locked into a White-centered perspective-particularly the
Supreme Court-can come to recognize and appreciate that their views
373. Minow, supra note 1, at 15.
374. Id. at 16.
375. Id. at 16.
376. SCHLAG, supra note 283, at 58.
377. Id. at 59. See id. ("That frightened and weary perspective.. is the one that
knows how to question its gods, its values, but dares not do so, for fear of confronting a
loss that it knows, on some level, has already occurred.").
378. Minow, supra note 1, at 15.
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on racial matters reflect only a particular racial experience formed in a
racialized culture that neither speaks for nor completely exhausts the
metaphysical truth about America's racial reality.
Through its recognition, the Court can come to not only appreciate
its own perspective as both racialized and limited, but also simply as only a
perspective, and thus to respect competing perspectives that may see the
world, both literally and figuratively, through a different-colored lens.
Without that threshold recognition, the differences in racially-inflected
perspectives "admit no common ground," and result in
black and white Americans ... tak[ing] possession of distinct
paradigms .... [with] blacks and whites look[ing] upon the so-
cial and political world in fundamentally different and
mutually unintelligible ways [while] .... speak[ing] across dif-
ferent theoretical [mindsets] .... 379
As a consequence, "[W]hite and black citizens appear to have a ter-
rible time talking to one another about race." 380 However, despite the size
of the gap that separates the White-centered from the Non-White-
centered view of racial reality, although it is not impossible to engage in
"democratic discussion across the racial divide .... it is hard."
3 ',
A significant part of the problem in speaking across different racial
paradigms is that the White-centered perspective, especially as articulated
by the Supreme Court, refuses to acknowledge that it is a racial paradigm
and that it reflects a particular racial perspective. Therefore, the Court
cannot recognize the existence of any legitimate competition. Given the
logic of this perspective, since the Court's perspective represents the ob-
jective truth, its only competition must be falsity, error or untruth.
From this perspective, any dissenting opinions are dismissed as inter-
est-based ideologies or identity politics, and engaged in for the sole
purpose of enlightening them or bringing them up to the point where
they can be converted to also see the world through the White-centered
perspective. This is essentially missionary work to save the godless and
savage souls of the unenlightened rather than legitimate political engage-
ment with ideological opponents who are worthy of respect and dignity.
This is not a sound basis for deliberation because, by definition, such a
perspective seeks not mutual respect but rather demands absolute surren-
der, total capitulation and ultimate assimilation.
Finding common ground requires, first, attaining "a language of mu-
tual respect, 382 and hopefully through that process of mutual respect, also
come to see the critical influence that our mutual scars and wounds have
379. KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 7, at 288.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 289.
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in determining the perspectival line of sight from which we all experi-
ence and understand racial reality. This simple act of mutual respect and
validation can potentially have deeply transformative and healing effects
on America's discordant racial dialogue, which in the end could allow
society to talk about race more comfortably, productively, and realistically,
as race is actually lived in America rather than merely how it is imagined
and perceived thorough a White-centered lens. This is a goal we must
achieve if racial inequality is ever to be solved, and although achieving this
goal will surely require much hard work, "[T]he stakes are [so] high
' 383
that failure cannot be an option.
The rising flood waters of Hurricane Katrina showed America a dis-
tinctly racialized world of Blackness, poverty, suffering, and death that it
preferred not to see; a world that it had convinced itself was part of
America's shameful past and not its triumphant present. Most Whites in
America recoiled at what they saw but to this day insist that it had noth-
ing to do with race.384
In striking contrast to the predominate White reaction, most Non-
Whites generally (and Blacks in particular) in America saw it quite differ-
ently;385 in those heart-wrenching scenes, we saw not alien others, but our
own faces, our own loved ones and our own families, suffering, pleading,
dying and crying for help that seemed incomprehensively slow in coming,
and shockingly indifferent to the appalling specter of human suffering on
such a massive scale. From our perspective, we understood that, as the old
saying goes, "There but for the grace of God, go I." Such is the power of
perspective.
As a consequence, the message seems to be that if America does not
heed the warning that Katrina laid so bare in our living rooms day after
excruciating day for what seemed like an eternity, and learn, as James
Baldwin wrote, to "insist on, or create, the consciousness of the others"
'386
then perhaps the great American experiment in democracy has indeed
passed the crest of the arc of history and begun its slow descent into
oblivion. If so, then perhaps, as Baldwin so eloquently observed, the "ful-
fillment of that prophecy, recreated from the Bible in song by a slave, is
upon us: 'God gave Noah the rainbow sign, [and said] No more water, the
fire next time!' ,387
383. Id. ("Race, Du Bois chastened us, is 'merely a concrete test of the underlying
principles of the great republic.' As it was in the beginning of the twentieth century, so it is
now at the end.") (citing WE.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 14 (Vintage Press
1990)(1903)).
384. Page & Puente, supra note 24.
385. Id.
386. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TME (1963), reprinted in THE PRICE OF THE
TIcKET 379 (1924).
387. Id.
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